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*  *  *  *  * PREFACE 
The countries of  Central and South America have been the focus of  attention in the Eco-
nomic and Social Committee on several occasions in recent years.  The Committee has 
drawn up a number of  Opinions and Information Reports on the region and, in particu-
lar, on the European Community's relations with Latin America, the last one as recently 
as January 1990 (Rapporteur: Mr Vasco CAL). 
Since then, however, several major developments have occurred affecting directly or in-
directly relations between the European Community and Latin America. Above all, the 
geopolitical situation has changed to a remarkable extent, requiring the Latin American 
countries to look afresh at their position in the world as a whole. Another major develop-
ment has been the extent to which regional cooperation in Latin America has taken root. 
MERCOSUR has sprung to life: Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, and Uruguay have set 
their course on integration. Euro-Latin American political dialogue is flourishing, meet-
ings abound, particularly between the EC and the Rio Group (Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, 
Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Mexico, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay and Venezuela); and be-
tween the EC and Central America in the context of  the San Jose Conferences. 
Whilst both the San Jose Conference and the Rio Group had their origins in the troubles 
then holding sway in the Central American Isthmus, moves are now afoot to bring about 
economic integration in the region, involving Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Hon-
duras and Nicaragua. The Andean Pact countries (Colombia, Peru, Ecuador and Bolivia), 
too,  are making moves to revive the Pact, it having lain dormant for several years. 
The Economic and Social Committee has taken good note of  the fact that on 4 February 
1991 the EC 's Council of  Ministers approved what the European Commission had the 
previous year presented as its Guidelines for Community Cooperation with Latin America 
and Asia. In so doing,  the Community clearly intended to give a boost to its longstand-
ing relations with Latin America. 
After the so-called ''lost decade'' of  the 1980s, Latin America would seem now to be 
undergoing -in economic terms -a silent revolution. It is, too, in many cases, having 
to face up to the challenges that so often accompany the consolidation of  democracy. 
Because the Economic and Social Committee has been monitoring these developments, 
and always strives to give the Community Institutions the views of  Employer,  Trade-
Union,  Farmer and other interest groups at times of  policy change, it decided to have 
its Section for External Relations, Trade and Development Policy prepare an Informa-
tion Report as a precursor, possibly, to an Opinion drawing on the Conclusions of  the 
present Report. 
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The position of Latin America in the new international situation 
Consequences for Latin America of the new 
world order 
The bipolar world of  the post  -war period has been replaced 
by a new international situation, with the end of the Cold 
War and the rise of economic superblocs centring on the 
United States, the European Community and Japan, Latin 
America's main economic partners. The fresh challenges 
facing Latin America stem from this new world order and 
the need to strengthen democracy, as well as for economic 
and social consolidation. 
On the economic front, the way the international situation 
develops and the consequent effects on Latin America will 
depend on the outcome of  the GATT Uruguay Round, the 
impact of  the European Single Market on trade with Latin 
America, the scope of the North American Free Trade 
Agreement (NAFTA) and the possible materialization of  the 
Initiative for the Americas. How Latin America responds 
to these new international challenges will depend on its abil-
ity to achieve levels of  productivity and competitiveness con-
ducive to sustained development, and to exploit the new 
opportunities of the world market. 
The uncertain prospects for economic recovery in the USA 
and progress on the GATT will affect the chances of  mak-
ing  a  success  of and developing  relations  between the 
USA/NAFTA and Latin America. Nonetheless, the USA 
seems to want increased trade with Latin America as a way 
of  stimulating its own economy and securing an economic 
bloc under its leadership as a bulwark against the growing 
influence of Japan and the EC. 
On the other hand, there are fears that Latin America's role 
in the new world order will be marginal, as the region will 
not figure among the new trade blocs' priorities and will not 
have sufficient financial resources to afford the economic 
conversion necessary for its integration into the world econ-
omy. However, the tendency towards economic recovery 
in Latin America in the 1990s suggests that the region has 
the  potential  to  relaunch  itself with  better competitive 
prospects. 
Eastern Europe, the Commonwealth of  Independent States 
(CIS), North Africa and South East Asia may attract more 
investment,  trade and economic cooperation than Latin 
America, damaging the region's chances of  benefiting from 
trade  expansion  and  more  economic  programmes. 
However, the slight increase in cooperation with the Euro-
pean Community on an institutionalized basis, the advent 
of  the Initiative for the Americas and the possible establish-
ment of  the NAFT  A show that interest in Latin America has 
not diminished. 
On the political front, the end of the East-West conflict is 
furthering  the  general  tendency  in  Latin  America  to 
democratization and helping promote peace in countries 
which have suffered armed struggles for many years. Peace 
has been achieved in Nicaragua, El Salvador and, to a great 
extent, Colombia, although confrontation continues in Peru 
and Guatemala. 
The Organization of American States (OAS) has grown 
stronger in recent years and has been active in condemning 
anti-democratic activities,  in peace negotiations and the 
defence of  human rights. Moreover, some countries have 
set about gradually reducing the size of  their armed forces. 
It is important for Latin America to diversify its political 
and economic relations in the new international situation, 
and the tendency in the region has been to build up relations 
with the USA, the EC and Japan. It is to be hoped that La-
tin America will be able to adopt a unified position vis-a-
vis the new role of the international organizations such as 
the OAS and the UN, particularly in the defence of  democra-
cy and peace. 
Relations with the economic blocs 
(USA - EC - Japan) 
The population of  Latin America was 426 million in 1990, 
compared with 327 million for the EC, 251 million for the 
USA and 123 million for Japan. Latin America's per capi-
ta income in the same year was $2,490, compared with 
$18,118 for the EC, $21,551 for the USA and $23,001 for 
Japan. This is hardly surprising when one considers that the 
above economic superblocs account for 70% of  world GDP 
but only 20% of world population. 
The USA and Latin America 
The USA continues to be Latin America's main economic 
and trade partner and one of  its main sources of  international 
cooperation. In 1990 approximately 39% of  Latin Ameri-
can exports went to the USA, and imports from the USA 
accounted for 40.7% of the total. However, Latin Ameri-
ca accounts for only a small proportion of the USA's total 
external trade: it provides 12.42% of  US imports and takes 
12.57% of its exports. 
40% of  US direct investment in developing countries goes 
to Latin America. For some Latin American countries this 
represents 70% of  all foreign direct investment. US official 
development aid to Latin America amounted to $1,066 mil-
lion in 1990, or 34% of the regional total. 
The establishment of the NAFT  A and possibly of a com-
plex network of  regional and bilateral trade agreements with 
the third countries of the region will reinforce this role. 
Moreover, the debt policy of the USA and the policies of 
the international financial institutions are of  vital importance 
to the Latin American economies. 6  EC/Latin American relations 
In the field of  politics, now that the USA's national securi-
ty and continental geopolitical fears have receded, pressure 
will be stepped up for action to combat the drugs trade. The 
USA is deeply concerned by the influx of  millions of  Latin 
Americans over the last few decades. It is estimated that be-
tween 1 and 1.5 million Latin Americans attempt to enter 
the USA illegally each year. On other fronts, the USA has 
urged some countries to cut their armed forces and has sup-
ported peace negotiations in Nicaragua and El Salvador af-
ter ten years of  a policy of  counter-insurgency and low-level 
war. 
The EC and Latin America 
There are strong historical, political and cultural links be-
tween Latin America and the EC. However, the EC'  s eco-
nomic presence has not increased substantially and trade has 
actually shrunk significantly. In 1990 22.9% of  the region's 
exports went to the EC, whilst imports from the EC amount-
ed to 18.2% of  the total. Thirty years ago Europe obtained 
10% of  its imports from Latin America, and 9% of  its ex-
ports went to the region. These percentages have now been 
halved.  One of the reasons for this is  the CAP and the 
preferential treatment of the Lome Convention countries 
which has restricted access for Latin American agricultur-
al products. 
Direct investment in Latin America by the EC Member 
States in 1987 and 1988 amounted to 45% of  the OECD to-
tal, or approximately one third of  overall foreign direct in-
vestment. In 1990 the EC overtook the USA as the main 
provider of  official development aid to Latin America with 
$1,291 million, or 41% of the total. 
The political dialogue between the two regions has been in-
stitutionalized via the annual interministerial conferences 
between the EC, the Rio Group and the San Jose Process. 
A package of  regional agreements are planned with the Car-
tagena Agreement and Central American countries, and 
bilateral  agreements  with  Argentina,  Uruguay,  Brazil, 
Chile, Paraguay and Mexico. There are Commission dele-
gations in 8 Latin American countries: Chile, Argentina, 
Uruguay, Brazil, Peru, Venezuela, Costa Rica and Mexi-
co. Since 1974 there have been biennial conferences be-
tween the European Parliament and the Latin American 
Parliament. 
The EC 's role has made it possible to diversify international 
relations and markets. For Central America the political di-
alogue has been a source of  stability, a safeguard against the 
crisis in the region spreading. Current relations are mainly 
economic however. 
The role of  Japan 
Japan, which takes only 6.3% of  Latin American exports, 
continues to dwindle in importance as a market for Latin 
American products. In 1990 imports from Japan were sta-
ble at about 6.1 %.  These trade figures seem even lower 
when considered as a proportion of Japanese totals (only 
3.93% of Japanese imports come from Latin America, 
whilst the region takes a modest 3.06% of Japan's total 
exports). 
An estimated 17% of  Japanese foreign investment goes to 
Latin America, although Japan has hitherto been less im-
portant as a source of  foreign direct investment than the main 
European countries. Japan's official development aid to La-
tin America in 1990 was $482 million, or 15.3% of  the to-
tal. Japan has not played a significant political role, although 
its presence in the sub-continent is growing, particularly in 
connection with direct investment. The Latin American 
markets of the Pacific seaboard are of interest to Japan. 
Formation of a  regional  bloc  or increasing 
openness? 
The impact on the US economy of the ongoing US/Japan 
rivalry and the emergence of  the European Single Market 
raises the question whether the present process of seeking 
cooperation and integration with the Latin American coun-
tries through the NAFT  A and the Initiative for the Ameri-
cas is part of  a policy of  regionalizing the world economy. 
As the dominant economic partner of Latin America, the 
US is already in a favourable position to further increase its 
influence in this region and to create a market of  more than 
700 million people. 
In a recent study the OECD concludes that the present 
process of  cooperation and integration between the US and 
Latin America does not necessarily imply a regionalization 
of  the world economy. The OECD considers the US policy 
to be part of  a programme aiming at supporting the recent 
political and economic reforms in Latin America, and at the 
same time trying to secure support for their position in the 
Uruguay Round. The strong economic basis and sustaina-
ble domestic political basis necessary for a commitment to 
regionalism are lacking.  The same is true for the Latin 
American countries, although the integration process has 
raised high expectations amongst most of the countries. 
Although regionalism is not really to be feared, the emerging 
process of  integration will require a continuing effort to recon-
cile globalism with the development of  regional trade blocs. 
Also Latin America will be faced with this challenge. Main events and tendencies in Latin America  7 
Main events and tendencies in Latin America 
The challenge of democracy 
Democratization 
The 1960s and 1970s were a period of  military rule in most 
of the Latin American countries, with the exception of 
Venezuela, Colombia, Mexico and Costa Rica. The 1980s 
saw the re-establishment of  elected governments. At present 
only Cuba and Haiti still have non-elected governments, and 
Peru a de facto government. 
Between 1988 and 1990 22 elections were held in 19 coun-
tries. The most striking feature of these elections was the 
fact that for the first time in recent decades power was trans-
ferred from one elected civilian government to another in 
Bolivia, El Salvador, Guatemala, Uruguay, Argentina and 
Brazil. In Paraguay and Chile the long dictatorships of 
Stroessner and Pinochet were brought to an end. The general 
elections scheduled in 16 countries for the period 1993-1995 
will be another important step towards the consolidation of 
democracy. 
This decision to opt for democracy was reflected in the con-
demnation by the regional bodies of the coups d'etat of 4 
February and 27 November 1992 in Venezuela, that of30 
September 1991 in Haiti and the institutional coup of  5 April 
1992 in Peru. The vitality of  democracy was confirmed by 
the signing of  a declaration at the Second lbero-American 
Summit of  Heads of  State and Government held in Madrid 
on 23 and 24 July 1992, which was attended by 18 Latin 
American Heads of  State and their Portuguese and Spanish 
counterparts. 
Difficulties in consolidating democracy 
However, in some countries there are clear weaknesses in 
the democratic structures. The armed forces of many of 
these countries continue to wield great influence and do not 
consider themselves subordinate to the civil authorities. Dis-
putes and mutual mistrust between national parliaments and 
sections of  some governing parties on the one hand, and the 
executive on the other, are a feature of political life in 
Guatemala, Panama, Nicaragua, Brazil, Venezuela, Argen-
tina, Ecuador (during the administration of  President Rodri-
go Borja), to some extent Bolivia, and Peru before the 
institutional  coup.  The  intensity  and  impact  of these 
parliament  -government tensions vary from country to coun-
try, as do the background circumstances. 
These disputes arise because in some countries, e.g. Brazil, 
Peru, Nicaragua and Guatemala, the current President did 
not emerge from the political parties but was elected under 
an entirely separate procedure. This has resulted above all 
in the loss of  these political institutions' credibility with the 
electorate. In other cases differences have arisen between 
the executive and legislature when the President had applied 
(usually  economic)  policies  incompatible  with  the 
programme of the government by which he was chosen. 
Most of  the countries have a presidential system conferring 
sweeping powers on  the executive. However, there are cases 
of  institutional dislocation leading to ungovernability, as in 
the Venezuelan crisis. In  some cases it is the democratic sys-
tem and its institutions which have lost credibility; this was 
used as a pretext for the institutional coup in Peru, where 
a further military-backed coup was attempted on 13 Novem-
ber 1992. The suspension of  President Fernando Collor and 
the political maturity displayed by the parliament represent 
a first step in resolving Brazil's deep political crisis and are 
a gauge of  the effectiveness of  its democracy. Stabilization, 
however, remains to be achieved. 
Some countries still do not have an independent judiciary 
free of political pressure and corruption. The public ad-
ministrations of some countries continue to be very unsta-
ble, highly politicized, unwilling to modernize, inefficient 
and lacking in appropriate human and material resources. 
Cuts in the unwieldy bureaucracy under the pressure of 
structural adjustment measures have not resulted in great-
er efficiency, and in some cases important programmes for 
disadvantaged  sections  of  the  population  have  been 
abandoned. 
The social cost of structural adjustment and consequent 
popular  discontent,  together  with  weaknesses  in  the 
democratic structures, are destabilizing factors in many of 
these countries. Nevertheless, the fact that since 197  6 only 
the military coup in Haiti has succeeded in unseating a 
directly elected President is an indicator of  democratic con-
tinuity, despite difficulties. 
Human rights 
There has been a substantial improvement in human rights 
in many of  the countries which have restored democracy. 
However, a high level of political violence continues in 
Peru, Haiti and, to a lesser extent, Guatemala and Colom-
bia, in both of  which negotiations or peace talks have been 
held with guerilla groups. In Cuba there is a lack of civil 
liberties. 
There is also growing social violence and civil insecurity 
in the Dominican Republic, Brazil, Mexico and Central 
America, with the exception of  Costa Rica. The appearance 
of paramilitary groups aimed at eradicating supposed an-
tisocial elements, including street children, in cities like Rio 
de Janeiro and Bogota is very worrying. It  is estimated that 
40 children are murdered each month in Rio de Janeiro. 
In  many of  these countries the legal infrastructure is not such 
as to guarantee the full respect of  human rights. There is also 
marked social discrimination against women, particularly 8  EC/Latin American relations 
rural areas in the form of  a double burden of  work and fa-
mily responsibilities and greater work insecurity. The lack 
of  recognition of  the rights of  ethnic minorities is a source 
of  tension, particularly in countries with a large indigenous 
population such as Bolivia, Peru, Ecuador and Guatemala. 
The indigenous population of  the region is estimated at 30 
million. 
In its 1992 report on violations of  trade union rights the In-
ternational Confederation of  Free Trade Unions (ICFTU) 
expresses the view that America is the most dangerous con-
tinent for the defenders of free trade unionism. In all the 
countries there were various instances of  failure to respect 
these rights. The worst violence against trade unionists oc-
curred in Guatemala, Colombia, Peru and certain other 
countries. Workers in manufacturing are the most vulner-
able, lacking the basic rights enshrined in the various labour 
laws, and having a higher risk of  workplace accidents and 
working conditions detrimental to their health. 
The drugs problem 
The Latin American drugs trade distorts economic develop-
ment and damages the democratic structures as its institu-
tions and authorities succumb to corruption. The modus 
operandi of  the drug cartels and the spread of  consumption 
among the young also entail severe social consequences. 
In Bolivia, Peru and Colombia it is estimated that between 
600,000 and 1. 5 million people (almost 4% of  the working 
population) are directly employed in the drugs trade. In the 
1980s this activity brought a poor peasant a per acre income 
ten times that of  a cacao grower and 21 times that of  a rice 
grower. 
The producer, transit and money laundering countries suffer 
serious problems of  security, sovereignty and governabili-
ty. All the countries in the region are affected to a greater 
or lesser degree. In the coming years the international war 
on drugs will become ever more complex, and there could 
be targeted external interventions. In this context the deci-
sion of  the US Supreme Court of 15 June 1992 permitting 
the pursuit of  international criminals outside the USA should 
be cited. The drugs problem could also be used as an argu-
ment for a return to military rule and low-level wars, as is 
happening in Peru in the confrontation with the guerrillas 
and drug traffickers. 
This problem has grave consequences for the US and Eu-
rope, which are witnessing an upsurge of  urban violence. 
50% of street crime in these countries is  drug-related. 
45 million people are estimated to take drugs world-wide, 
the greatest concentration being in these two regions. 
The economic repercussions are also being felt in the de-
veloped countries, given the enormous amount of money 
involved - calculated  at  between  US $300,000 -
$500,000 million p.a. across the world, greater than the 
international oil trade. 
90% of  cocaine is produced in Bolivia, Colombia and Peru. 
200 tonnes a year-accounting for 6.  7% of  world consump-
tion-is imported into EC countries. The amount of  cocaine 
consumed in the EC countries in 1989 was 90% higher than 
the previous year. 
The challenge of environmental decline 
According to FAO (UN Food and Agriculture Organization) 
data, the tropical forests are being depleted 50% faster than 
in the preceding decade. 17 million hectares vanish every 
year, equivalent to the combined area of  Austria, Denmark 
and the Netherlands.  Between 1981  and 1990, 40% of 
deforestation in the developing countries occurred in Latin 
America. Forest cover in the humid, tropical areas is the 
worst affected. 
The causes include badly-run, destructive forms of  agricul-
ture, the uncontrolled felling of  trees with no reforestation, 
mineral extraction which produces deforestation and pol-
lution, infrastructure and dam projects with a negative en-
vironmental impact, migration towards areas rich in natural 
resources, and the drugs industry. 
Industry and vehicle emissions have increased considera-
bly, although 60% of C02 emissions are concentrated in 
the industrialized countries while forest burning in the 
Amazon basin only accounts for 4%, and vehicle exhausts 
in the developing countries 29% . However, poor waste 
management is a cause for concern, polluting rivers and na-
ture reserves. Air pollution principally affects major conur-
bations which are also large industrial centres like Mexico 
City, Lima, Santiago de Chile, Sao Paulo and so on. The 
extraction and improper use of  oil resources and products 
is one of the major sources of pollution in the region. 
According to the Economic Commission for Latin Ameri-
ca (ECLA) US $40,000 million-worth of environmental 
programmes are needed. Policies, plans and practical me-
ans and projects are all required to achieve sustained forest 
growth, clean up polluting industries, limit urban migration, 
control vehicle emissions, introduce proper waste manage-
ment, devise educational campaigns and attain other ob-
jectives. 
The economic outlook after the ''lost decade'' 
Nature and impact of economic restructuring policy 
The 1980s were a ''lost'' decade for Latin America in terms 
of  economic growth, social development and integration into 
the world economy. The region's per capita GDP at the end 
of the decade was lower than at the beginning. Excessive 
inflation and public deficit were widespread, while the for-
eign debt soared to unprecedented levels and its share of 
world trade fell. As a result of  the shortfall in public funds, 
levels of educational provision and public health care and 
housing- particularly for low-income groups-deteriorat-
ed significantly, producing an increase in the percentage of 
the population classified as poor from 41 % in 1980 to 44% 
in 1989. Main events and tendencies in Latin America  9 
In the light of  this situation, thorough-going structural re-
forms  were carried out,  focussing  principally on three 
aspects: a redefmition of  the State's role in generating eco-
nomic development, the promotion of  the region's integra-
tion into the international economic system, and making the 
productive system more competitive. As set out below, these 
three aspects are closely linked. 
In line with the prevailing post-war model of  economic de-
velopment, the Latin American countries saw the State as 
the principal factor in economic development. The State 
consequently assumed a number of  highly diverse economic 
functions and was involved in a wide range of  branches of 
production. State intervention, however, finally outstripped 
its administrative capacity, becoming inefficient and inhibit-
ing the growth of  a dynamic private productive sector. The 
public debt, both domestic and foreign, accompanied by 
acute  fmancial  crises,  clearly  signalled the end of the 
model's usefulness. However, it should be noted that the 
public debt was affected in part by the pursuit of alterna-
tive ways of  meeting socio-economic development needs. 
Those organizations which provided funds during this peri-
od without regard for the consequences must also bear a 
share of the responsibility. 
The new neo-liberal model currently in favour, which is 
gaining ground in Latin America too, puts the private sec-
tor to the forefront of  economic development, with the State 
restricting its economic role to the creation of  a stable frame-
work within which private activity can take place and to the 
provision of  basic social services. As part of  this trend, the 
various  Latin  American  countries  have  embarked  on 
deregulation and public sector privatization programmes 
which in some cases, such as Argentina, will involve the sale 
of  almost all state-run enterprises to the domestic and for-
eign private sector. In other cases, such as Uruguay, the 
majority of the people have rejected privatization. 
State structural reform is not restricted to deregulation: it 
is accompanied by stricter monetary policy. Greater dis-
cipline had been demanded by a number of international 
financial bodies as a necessary means oflowering inflation 
rates,  which rose to more than  1,000 %  p.a.  in some 
countries. 
A new attitude to external economic relations is also in the 
air. The former policy of  relative protectionism, based on 
import substitution as a way of  boosting domestic industry, 
is giving way to a new approach in which the export sec-
tor, whose effectiveness is to be founded on its competitive-
ness on the international market, is becoming the main 
driving force for economic activity. To this end, tariff  and 
other barriers have been lowered - in the case of  countries 
such as Mexico, Bolivia, Venezuela or  Costa Rica, as a con-
dition of  membership of  GA  TI, to which most Latin Ameri-
can  countries  now  belong.  Only  Honduras,  Panama, 
Ecuador and Paraguay are still awaiting entry. Simultane-
ously,  incentives for foreign  investment have been in-
troduced, and export-oriented exchange policies devised. 
Greater economic competitiveness is one of  the primary ob-
jectives of structural reform. This involves concentrating 
efforts on technological development, raising educational 
and vocational training standards and the provision of in-
centives for the creation of  a more decentralized and diver-
sified productive structure. These measures should help 
Latin American products be more competitive on the world 
market on the basis of  quality and productivity, not  just rela-
tively lower prices. 
Progress in structural reform is not uniform throughout the 
subcontinent.  An overall view reveals the formation of 
different groups of  countries: one in which reform continued 
uninterrupted  throughout  the  1980s  (Chile,  Mexico, 
Bolivia); another in which reform is more recent, and the 
outcome is consequently more uncertain (Argentina, Brazil, 
Venezuela, Costa Rica, Colombia); and, lastly, countries 
such as Peru, Nicaragua, Honduras or El Salvador where 
reform, although under way, has yet to produce any results. 
Any classification of  this kind must, however, be interpreted 
in the light of the factors,  conditions and determinants 
specific to each country. 
The economy at a turning point 
Economic indicators are indeed encouraging, and this is not 
simply a result of  macroeconomic change -the reward is be-
ing reaped of the painful restructuring undertaken in the 
1980s. The 1990s are already being described as  Latin 
America's ''decade of hope''. 
The Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) estimates that 
in 1991, after three years of  stagnation, the region's GDP 
rose by 2.2% A growth rate of some 3% is projected for 
1992. Predictably, the rise in the growth rate is not uniform: 
Chile, Mexico, Venezuela and Argentina, countries which 
implemented their reform measures more swiftly or which, 
like Venezuela and Mexico, profit from oil exports, have 
attained rates close to or even greater than 5%. The situa-
tion is quite different in Brazil, whose GDP accounts for 
more than 35% of the Latin American total, but which is 
still relatively stagnant with a zero growth rate in 1991. 
Brazil's importance for the Latin American economy as a 
whole is evident, and any economic recovery there would 
constitute  a  further  stimulus  for  the  new-look  Latin 
America. 
Positive growth indicators should not obscure the fact that 
in per capita income terms, Latin America remains at prac-
tically the same level as 15 years ago. Success against in-
flation has largely resulted from strict monetary policy. 
Argentina is a good example: the drastic cut in the public 
deficit, accompanied by the blanket ban on funding the 
deficit by the Central Bank, has brought inflation down from 
1. 344% in 1990 to a figure for the last quarter of 1991 
equivalent to an annual rate of 6%. Inflation has fallen in 
countries which have opted for this kind of  measure, with 
varying degrees of stringency, to a general level close to 
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The climate of  confidence in Latin American economic de-
velopment is demonstrated by a positive fmancial flow into 
the region for the first time since 1981. Some US $7,000 
million are estimated to have been injected in 1991, in con-
trast to the negative flow of  US $16,000 million the year be-
fore. This movement largely corresponds to the increase in 
direct foreign  investment,  boosted by the privatization 
programmes. It  is thought that a repatriation of  national cap-
ital is also taking place.  This improvement also helped 
reduce the sums to be paid in accrued interest and foreign 
debt servicing from US $34,000 million in 1990 to US 
$29,000 million in 1991. It should be pointed out, in rela-
tion to foreign debt, that although a reduction in the accumu-
lated sum has not been achieved - it in fact grew from US 
$423,000 million to US $431,000 million in 1991 accord-
ing to IDB data- the successive restructuring plans under 
the Brady Plan, which has been extended to almost all the 
countries of Latin America, do hold out the prospect of a 
manageable situation in the medium-term. Nevertheless, an 
OECD study reveals that only Mexico and Costa Rica have 
any positive results to show for implementing the Brady 
Plan. The debt problem continues to pose a serious threat 
to Latin American economies, and could once again help 
trigger future crises. 
In addition to direct investment, large quantities of  foreign 
and repatriated capital have been attracted to the region by 
high stock exchange profitability. The Latin American stock 
markets have unquestionably experienced an unprecedented 
boom. The following statistics give an idea of  the volume 
of the investment explosion:  traded securities grew by 
47.5% in Mexico between May 1990 and April1991, while 
it is expected that the amount traded on the Brazilian finan-
cial market will have risen from US $450 million in 1991 
to US $2,000 million in 1992, and there were seven times 
more transactions on the Buenos Aires stock exchange in 
1991 than in the previous year. However, there are signs 
of a recent downward trend in such transactions in some 
countries and the stock exchanges are beginning to look un-
stable. 
The removal of  import obstacles, combined with the con-
traction of  international trade and the fall in the prices of  cer-
tain raw materials which account for the bulk of Latin 
American exports, has led to a worsening trade balance in 
the region. Export values in 1991 were the same as in 1990, 
although the actual volume increased. Imports, on the other 
hand, rose by 19% in 1991, mostly to Argentina, Mexico 
and Venezuela. This trend seems unlikely to change in the 
immediate future: on the contrary, heavier current account 
deficits are expected in most Latin American countries. The 
balance of  payments situation will be offset by the net capi-
tal inflow principally driven, as described above, by direct 
foreign investment. 
The Latin American economic situation must, in the final 
analysis, be viewed within the international context. The 
economic crisis affecting a large number of  Western coun-
tries and the delay in the GATT Uruguay Round have not 
helped Latin America as it pursues integration into, and a 
greater share of, the world trade structure. Developments 
such as the opening-up of Eastern Europe or the creation 
of the European Single market do not, however, seem to 
have affected direct investment in the region, despite fore-
casts to the contrary. Investment has been flowing in, at-
tracted by the structural changes heralding a  period of 
greater stability and economic growth. 
Social impact of  economic restructuring policy 
Social imbalances 
The economic adjustment policies implemented to appar-
ently positive effect in Latin America during the second half 
of  the 1980s have entailed a considerable social cost. Un-
employment, caused in part by the tough policy of  privatiz-
ing public enterprises and reducing administrative staff, 
together with cuts in social expenditure by governments 
weighed down by public-sector deficits, has had the greatest 
effect on the most vulnerable sectors of society. 
This process, however, comes on top of  what was already 
a distorted economic structure, and this is the principal cause 
of social imbalance. Many factors have contributed, such 
as the lack of  real agrarian and industrial reform, the chronic 
inadequacy of  social services, the foreign debt problem with 
its burden of  an outward flow of  resources, or the absence 
of  an urban development policy in the face of  mass migra-
tion to huge metropolitan centres with their increasingly in-
human living conditions. 
This negative picture is even more striking in the case of 
economies such as Peru, Colombia or most of  the Central 
American countries, embroiled in armed conflict. The so-
cial repercussions of  the Central American crisis were set 
out in the October 1991 UNICEF report on Central Ameri-
ca: 60% of  the population is under-nourished, poverty was 
estimated at 70% in 1989, 57% of  the population in unem-
ployed and 40% lack health care. In Peru, the social cost 
of  the climate of  violence can be seen in an underemploy-
ment rate of  86% and a minimum wage 8 times lower than 
would be needed to cover basic requirements. 
Human development and social cost 
The report on the ''human suffering list'' published by the 
Population Crisis Committee, a private non-profit making 
foundation in Washington, places much of Latin America 
in the group of  countries with ''high human suffering'', with 
only Argentina, Chile, Uruguay, Cuba, Jamaica, Panama 
and Costa Rica appearing among those with a moderate 
score, and Haiti alone among the Latin American countries 
with ''extreme suffering''. Variables such as life expectan-
cy, daily calorie intake, civil rights, per capita GDP or 
level of education were used to compile the list. 
Similar parameters were employed to draw up the UN De-
velopment Programme (UNDP) ''  1992 Human Develop-
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Development Index''. Uruguay, Chile, Costa Rica, Argen-
tina, Venezuela and Mexico appear, in descending order, 
among the 50 leading or ''High Human Development'' 
countries. All these countries occupy a higher place on this 
list than they do in per capita GDP terms. Countries such 
as Brazil, Colombia, Ecuador, Cuba and Peru are in the mid-
dle ''Medium Human Development'' range, at between 50 
and 100 on the list. "Low Human Development" countries 
include Bolivia, some Central American countries - El Sal-
vador, Nicaragua and Guatemala-with Haiti as the last La-
tin American country on the list coming 124th. 
More detailed analysis of  the situation shows that during the 
''lost  decade'' poverty in Latin America rose from 41 % to 
44%, according to ECLA figures. This has emerged with 
particular clarity in the major cities, subjected to strong 
migratory pressure. 50% of  the urban population lived in 
poverty in 1990: in 1960 the figure was only 28%. Migra-
tion to urban areas can only rise until polices to improve land 
distribution  and  modernize  farming  methods  are  im-
plemented. 
Social expenditure cuts imposed by restructuring have had 
a particular impact on health and education. Spending on 
education for the region as a whole rose only slightly be-
tween 1986 and 1989, from 3.3 to 3.5% of GDP, while 
health spending fell from 2 to 1. 8% of  GDP. The education 
budget fell in GDP terms in a number of countries where 
it had traditionally been high, such as Argentina, Uruguay 
and Chile. Mexico is the only country in which the propor-
tion of  the GDP allocated to education and health rose be-
tween 1986 and 1989.  A  stronger education system is, 
however, essential not only as a weapon against poverty, 
but also for modernization and technological innovation as 
demanded by international competition. llliteracy rates vary 
widely between the approximately 5% in Argentina to near-
ly 20% in Bolivia and Brazil, rising to almost 30% in El Sal-
vador and Honduras and 45 and 4  7% in Guatemala and Haiti 
respectively. 
Employment 
Employment has been hard hit by adjustment policy. Ac-
cording to the Inter-American Regional Organization of 
Workers of  the ICFTU, the severe economic crisis afflict-
ing Latin America has generated greater social inequality 
as a result of  the social security cuts and less stringent labour 
legislation entailed in deregulation, which is needed to at-
tract foreign investment. At the same time, the economic 
integration and privatization processes at work throughout 
the subcontinent have weakened the trade unions to the ad-
vantage of multinational companies. 
Although the official unemployment rate scarcely changed 
during the decade, the growth oflow-productivity jobs-or 
underemployment-continues to account for a large propor-
tion of  total employment. According to the Regional Em-
ployment Programme for Latin America and the Caribbean 
(PREALC), underemployment affected 34% of  the work-
ing population in 1980, but had risen to 37% in 1989. The 
rate of  underutilization of  the labour force, covering both 
underemployment and unemployment, was 40% in 1980, 
rising to 42% of  the working population in 1989, accord-
ing to the same source. 
Increased activity has also been noted in Latin America's 
unofficial economy.  The need for companies to pursue 
greater flexibility and cut costs in order to compete nation-
ally and internationally, the rigidity of  existing regulations, 
inefficient administrative bodies which make legislation a 
lengthy and expensive process, and excessive labour sup-
ply are proffered among the explanations for this increase. 
The trend is therefore towards more insecure employment, 
demonstrated by the increasing use of part-time and sub-
contracted working. It is estimated that in Greater Buenos 
Aires, for example, the percentage of  workers lacking any 
protection under social or labour law rose from 18.7% in 
1980 to 29.9% in 1988. 
A high growth strategy to remedy the unemployment and 
underemployment problem will not be easy given the fore-
cast rise in population. Economic growth bordering on 7% 
will do no more than absorb the additional expansion of  the 
labour force; 8% would be needed to make any headway 
against unemployment. However, the most optimistic es-
timates indicate 4% as the highest viable growth rate for the 
next few years, suggesting rising unemployment for the 
region. 
With nominal pay rises consistently below the rate of  infla-
tion, and the loss of  union bargaining power, real earnings 
fell in Latin America during the last decade in both the public 
and private sectors. The figures speak for themselves: be-
tween 1980 and 1989 real earnings in modem medium-and 
large-scale industrial concerns fell by 7%, rising to 30% for 
small companies, the same as in the public sector. Earnings 
fell by 42% in the unofficial sector, and the minimum ur-
ban wage fell by 24%. 
In the future, the people of  Latin America will become in-
creasingly vocal in their demands as the disadvantaged sec-
tors of  society press their claims for a greater share in the 
proceeds of the expected economic growth. It is essential 
that such demands be met by the authorities and that a co-
herent social policy be implemented if  social stability is to 
be attained. Consolidation of  democracy in the region is, 
in the long-term, incompatible with the marginalization of 
broad sectors of  the population and with a highly unequal 
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Regional integration and society 
Antecedents, objectives and hopes for 
integration in Latin America 
The objectives set by Latin American integration models 
have not been met over the last 20 years, intra-regional trade 
has stagnated and productive synergy between sectors has 
deteriorated. Intra-regional trade accounted for some 16.3% 
of  the total in 1980, which represents a high point in view 
of the current 13 % or so. 
During the  1960s and 70s,  Latin American integration 
processes were marked by a trend in favour of setting up 
a multilateral-type regional preference zone. Efforts were 
made to this end through the Latin American Free Trade As-
sociation (LAFT  A). Faced with the collapse of  this model, 
LAFT  A was progressively replaced from 1980 by the La-
tin American Integration Association (ALADI), with the 
aim of  fostering bilateral economic and trade agreements, 
based on complementarity between the various member 
countries' economies. 
Similarly, for the two most highly institutionalized process-
es, the Andean Pact and the Central American Common 
Market, an initial period oflimited achievements was suc-
ceeded by a crisis of  major proportions. They became para-
lysed under the  impact not only of the economic  and 
financial crisis sweeping throughout Latin America in the 
wake of  the exploding debt issue, but also of increasingly 
bureaucratic decision-making which hampered real progress 
towards integration. 
The adoption of domestic market-oriented development 
strategies, shielding regional economies from internation-
al competition, together with an import-substitution poli-
cy, cut the region off  from external markets, obstructed the 
modernization of  production and squeezed technology trans-
fers. Excessive expansion of  the State structure was matched 
only by its inefficiency, holding back economic growth. 
Integration has revived to some extent since the mid-1980s. 
New efforts focus on integrating the region's countries into 
the international economy and attracting foreign investment 
by expanding market size, at the same time responding to 
the region's worsening political and economic vulnerabili-
ty. Integration is firstly a response to the challenges and op-
portunities thrown up by an international context the clearest 
feature of  which is the emergence oflarge, dominant blocs; 
and secondly, a strategy geared to pressing internal develop-
ment needs, also linked to the aim of  consolidating democra-
cy in the region. 
The main emphasis in  the integration process is intended to 
strengthen the external stance of  the Latin American coun-
tries by reactivating intra-regional trade and, as a result, 
reinforcing the regional markets' support for efforts to in-
crease exports to outside the region. Integration is an ele-
ment in the strategy of  attaining greater competitiveness and 
productivity with a view to the world market, and it is hoped 
better conditions will be forthcoming in trade with the EC, 
NAFTA and Japan. 
The low level of  trade within the region and Latin Ameri-
ca's diminished share in world trade could be increased in 
the medium-term if  a new integration process is launched. 
This could have a significant influence on efforts in the 
region's countries to bring about internal consolidation and 
international integration. 
Current integration processes are represented by MER-
COSUR, involving Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay and Uru-
guay; the Central American Common Market (CACM) 
made up by Guatemala, El Salvador, Honduras, Nicaragua 
and Costa Rica;  and the Andean Pact,  which includes 
Venezuela, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru and Bolivia. MER-
COSUR will constitute a free trade zone and, at present, 
represents the most coherent and ambitious process, due the 
scale of the Argentinean and Brazilian economies. 
The CACM has failed, over the last 30  years, to achieve con-
solidation, but owes its continued existence to efforts tore-
vive it by creating the Central American Integration System 
(CAIS), which is currently at the ratification stage follow-
ing its signature in Tegucigalpa on 13  December 1991. The 
Andean Pact is undergoing a critical period in the wake of 
the Peruvian institutional coup and the application of  mar-
ket deregulation measures in that country which violate An-
dean Pact agreements. Peru currently has observer status 
in the Cartagena Agreement. Furthermore, Bolivia has ap-
plied for MERCOSUR membership-if  accepted, it would 
have to leave the Andean Pact. The MERCOSUR treaty 
does not, in any case, provide for any enlargement for a 
number of years. 
The Initiative for the Americas, the NAFTA and existing 
and future bilateral free trade agreements are new factors 
which are changing the face of  Latin American integration. 
Some observers have pointed out that the N AFT  A's sphere 
of  influence could extend to Central America, the Caribbean 
and the Group of  Three (Mexico, Colombia and Venezue-
la), forming the only energy self-sufficient region in the 
world. The Group of  Three could replace the Andean Pact, 
while the rest of South America would remain within the 
ambit of MERCOSUR, with which the EC has stronger 
trade links. 
A number of  countries such as Chile, Peru and Costa Rica 
continue to prefer a largely internationally-oriented policy, 
while others have chosen to integrate their economies gradu-
ally, as in the case of  MERCOSUR. However, the new in-
tegration approach includes maintaining an export  -based 
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Conditions, problems ~nd 
opportunities for intew-ation 
Overall, it may be stated that Latin American integration 
is going through a phase of reappraisal and powerlul for-
ward momentum, although the positive conseq~¢nces for 
growth are not yet evident.  The process is still. centred 
around trade and most of  the decisions still seem to concern 
trade. Its medium- and long-term success is dependent on 
stronger economic ties in the form of  a genuine interdepen-
dence of economies; among other things this will require 
the coordination of  macro-economic policies, the harmoni-
zation oflegislation, the creation or reinforcement of  region-
al  payment  systems,  greater  collaboration  between 
businessmen in the private sector and the setting-up of  com-
mon institutions with real management capability. 
In  some cases the pace at which changes in tariff, fiscal and 
monetary arrangements are being made is still somewhat out 
of sync - as is clearly shown in the case of Argentina and 
Brazil in MERCOSUR. Elsewhere some countries have ob-
ligations on two fronts, e.g. Venezuela and Colombia with 
the Group of Three and with the Andean Pact; this is the 
result of the political overriding the technical/  economic 
aspect of  objectives which on occasion have been set over-
hastily and whose compatibility is still not entirely clear. 
On the whole there has not yet been any movement away 
from general measures to p~licies for sectoral integration 
and there is little dovetailing between the agenda for integra-
tion and national agend~s.  · 
Certainly, as the time for major decisions approaches and 
the costs of  integration begin to be felt in some economies, 
there is nothing to indicate that some pressure for protec-
tionism will not re-emerge to derail the projects by means 
of  safeguard mechanisms, special arrangements and a whole 
gamut of para-tariff restrictions  such as  compensatory 
rights, customs duty exemptions and quotas. 
Some observers argue that neither the import-substitution 
integration model of recent decades, with its elements of 
redistribution and intervention, nor the new liberal develop-
ment model based on the external sector and integration into 
the  world market have proved capable of overcoming 
prevailing national interests and differing concepts of  how 
to share the costs and benefits of integration. 
The basic requirements for satisfactory integration are po-
litical will, the ability to institutionalize the process, which 
means the transfer of  sovereignty to supra-national institu-
tions, the need to extend the process to political and social 
structures, without whose support no progress is possible, 
and finally agreements on costs and benefits to facilitate the 
participation of  the less well-off countries. These will be the 
new challenges facing the next moves towards integration 
in this region. 
Relations between the EC and Latin America 
Economic relations 
Trade 
One of  the main reasons for the deterioration in the terms 
of  trade between Latin America and the Community is the 
· structural imbalance in trade: Latin America imports indus-
trial products (about 90% of  total imports from the EC) and 
exports basic commodities and fuels (about 80% of  total ex-
ports to the EC). This makes Latin American trade highly 
vulnerable to fluctuations in the prices of and demand for 
its basic commodities; it is affected by the protectionism im-
plicit in such instruments as the Common Agricultural Poli-
cy (CAP) and by the European advances in new technologies 
less dependent on traditional raw materials. 
In 1990 the principal Latin American importers of EC 
products were: Brazil (35.83% of total exports to Latin 
America), Argentina (13.53%) and Mexico (11.48%  ). The 
main countries to which the EC exported its products were: 
Mexico(24.67% ofthetotalin 1990), Brazil(23.22%)and 
Venezuela (10.76%). 
The main products imported by the EC from the Latin Ameri-
can sub-continent were: foodstuffs (32.36% of the total in 
1990), raw materials (18.83%) and manufactures (18.31 %). 
Its main exports were: machinery and transport equipment 
(  48.71 %) , chemicals (16.46%) and manufactures (12.39%). 
Latin America's main trading partners in the Community 
were: the Federal Republic of  Germany (accounting for 35% 
of exports and 25% of imports), followed by France, Italy, 
the United Kingdom and the Netherlands. 
In the 80s, 80% of~tin  American exports to the Commu-
nity consisted of  agricultural products, amounting to almost 
25% of total Community imports of this type of product. 
Bearing in mind the possibility of an increase in Commu-
nity demand for these products as a result of overall eco-
nomic growth in the EC and the abolition of  existing bilateral 
preferential trade agreements in the member countries in the 
wake of the completion of the European Single Market, 
bananas and coffee would seem to be the products for which 
there is a potential demand in the 90s. As regards sugar and 
other temperate zone products, an increase in Community 
demand will depend on CAP reform and progress in the 
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Despite the fact that the percentage of  Latin American ex-
ports to the Community has been stable since the last de-
cade, the percentage of  EC imports from Latin America has 
fallenfrom8.1% in 1970to5.9% in 1980to5.5% in 1990. 
At the same time the percentage of  Community exports to 
Latin America has fallen from 7.2% in 1970to6.4% in 1980 
to3.75% in 1990. In 198044% ofLatinAmericanexports 
covered by the GSP actually benefited from it; in 1988 this 
figure had risen to 58% . This trend should continue, above 
all if account is taken of the more preferential GSP treat-
ment accorded Peru, Bolivia and Colombia since 1991 and 
Central America since 1 January 1992, covering all products 
except bananas up until 1994. 
It is possible that measures such as the gradual abolition of 
national quantitative restrictions and safeguard measures 
which impede intra-Community trade, the removal of  non-
tariffbarriers, especially those involving technical standards 
and rules, the opening-up of  public contracts and the free-
dom to provide services will have a positive impact on EC 
trade with Latin America in the coming years. 
Investment and capital movements 
The total volume of  direct investment in Latin America from 
the countries of  the OECD'  s Development Assistance Com-
mittee (DAC) was almost $6,000 million in 1990 (exclud-
ing flows to off-shore centres). Mexico attracted most of  the 
direct foreign investment in 1990 and 1991, overtaking 
Brazil. Short- and long-term capital flows in 1991 reached 
around 10% of  Mexican GDP. Mexico's success in attract-
ing this capital, which largely consists of  direct foreign in-
vestment and portfolio investment, is due mainly to the 
open-economy policy introduced by President Salinas and 
the country's economic recovery, along with the easing of 
regulations on direct foreign investment. 
In terms of  accumulated value, the flow of  investment funds 
from Europe to Latin America over the period 1985-1990, 
excluding tax havens, was concentrated on Brazil (almost 
halt), followed by Argentina (15%), Mexico and Chile. The 
volume of direct foreign investment by the DAC/OECD 
members of  the EC in Latin America (excluding off-shore 
centres) was around $3,000 million for 1989 and 1990. 
A marked specialization in European investment according 
to country of  origin is also to be observed. In the case of  in-
vestment in Brazil, for instance, two or three sectors account 
for more than half  of  the direct investment of  each Europe-
an country. In Chile, investment is concentrated on the min-
ing sector, which attracted more than half of  direct foreign 
investment  in  1991  (against  47%  over  the  period 
1982-1991). The service sector comes next (29% of  direct 
foreign investment in the same period), while industry has 
been growing in importance over the last few years. Bel-
gian and French investment is concentrated in the chemi-
cals and commercial sector; Italian and German firms invest 
more in heavy industry - machinery, metallurgy and steel 
-and the motor vehicles industry; the Spanish, besides the 
steel industry, have recently shown interest in the services 
sector; British firms invest in oil, minerals and services. 
Impact of the European Single Market 
on Latin America 
The first effect of  the Single Market will be to generate trade 
between the Member States through increased growth and 
productivity in the EC. This means that the Latin Ameri-
can countries will also feel the effects of  a deflection of  trade, 
to which they will have to respond by offering a diversified 
range of  products which are competitive in price and quali-
ty. On the other hand, there will probably be an upsurge in 
trade for Latin America in primary agricultural and min-
ing commodities not produced in the Community. Clearly 
those Latin American countries which do not adopt such a 
competitive stance will find fewer outlets on the European 
Single Market,  since increasingly advanced production 
processes use less raw materials. 
It is anticipated that most of  the medium-income Latin Ameri-
can countries will be less affected by the Single Market. The 
extent to which these countries benefit from the growth in 
Community imports will basically depend on the success they 
have in improving their industrial base and their transport, in-
formation and marketing infrastructures as a sine qua non for 
boosting their exports to the Single Market. 
With regard to foreign investment, one effect of the Single 
Market could be to attract investment which would otherwise 
flow to the countries of  Latin America, especially if  the entry 
of  Eastern European countries into the Single Market is con-
firmed in the next few years. It is also possible, however, that 
competition  between  the  European,  Japanese  and  North 
American markets in the developing regions could attract Eu-
ropean investment to areas such as Latin America. 
A further benefit of  the Single Market could be that, with 
higher incomes and greater prosperity in the EC, Commu-
nity tourism to other countries is given a boost. This could 
represent an opportunity for Latin America, as the conti-
nent has an extensive tourist infrastructure. 
Another aspect to be considered is the question of Latin 
American citizens resident in Europe, insofar as double na-
tionality agreements could be replaced by new rules for the 
whole EC. These rules would introduce a new concept of 
Community citizenship. 
In short, there are two distinct and contrasting impressions 
as to the impact of the Single Market on Latin America: 
despite some claims that the Single Market will represent 
a closed trading bloc intent on protecting its own interests 
and wellbeing, there is no escaping the fact that Europe can-
not opt out from its international role in the post-Cold War 
era and that it is intertwined with Latin America in matters 
such as the environment, mass immigration and internation-
al drugs traffic. 
Cooperation 
EC-Latin America dialogue 
The initiatives undertaken in the field of  political dialogue 
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munity 's readiness to foster relations with Latin America. 
To this end various channels and instruments for political 
cooperation have been established between the two conti-
nents, centring on two aspects: political dialogue within the 
framework ofthe sub-regional cooperation initiatives-the 
San Jose Process in Central America and the Rio Group -
and bilateral political relations between the EC and Latin 
America, based on development cooperation. 
From October 1984 the San Jose Process institutionalized 
an official high-level political dialogue between the two 
regions, against the backdrop of  the Central American cri-
sis and mounting Community interest in backing regional 
peace initiatives. Since then annual bilateral meetings have 
been held. The last meeting- San Jose Vill- was held in 
Lisbon on 24/25 February 1992. On this occasion the Cen-
tral American ministers reiterated their interest in cooper-
ation  with  the  European  Community  with  a  view  to 
strengthening the electoral process and the rule of law in 
some countries of  the region and to promoting the respect 
of human rights. 
The political dialogue which, since September 1987, has 
been conducted between the EC and the Rfo Group builds 
on the experience acquired from the San Jose meetings in 
dealing with the Central American regional conflict; initially 
the dialogue was between the EC and the Contadora Group 
-Colombia, Mexico, Venezuela and Panama -later  joined 
by the countries of  the Contadora Support Group - Argen-
tina, Uruguay, Brazil and Peru. In contrast to the San Jose 
Process, the ministerial meetings of  the Community with 
the Rio Group were of  an informal nature until their institu-
tionalization as a result of  the Declaration of Rome on 20 
December 1990. The last meeting between the Ministers of 
Foreign Affairs of  both regions under the auspices of the 
Rio Group took place in Santiago de Chile on 28/29 May 
1992. The political conclusions of  the meeting take a posi-
tive view of  the strengthening of  democracy in Latin Ameri-
ca; in the field of economic cooperation, emphasis was 
placed on the importance for Latin America of  the expan-
sion of  European Investment Bank (Effi) external activities 
to the region, involving projects which are to be examined 
individually, as agreed by the EC Council on 13 May 1991. 
Scope  and  significance  of  European  development 
cooperation 
The EC Member States are developing their own national 
cooperation policies, in line with their foreign policy ob-
jectives; the EC must complement these national policies, 
as well as formulating and implementing its own develop-
ment cooperation policy. 
To this end, on 4 May 1991 the EC Council approved the 
new guidelines on financial and technical aid and econom-
ic cooperation with the developing countries of  Latin Ameri-
ca  and  Asia.  These  guidelines  drawn  up  by  the  EC 
Commission propose applying a balanced range of  cooper-
ation instruments to aid the Latin American developing 
countries, in addition to fixing multi-annual financial ob-
jectives for the period 1991-1995 and increasing the level 
of budgetary resources allocated to these countries. 
The Maastricht Treaty (1992), in the process of  ratification 
by the Member States, sets out, for the first time at treaty 
level, the principles of  a Community development cooper-
ation policy: Community policy in this sphere is to contrib-
ute to the general objective of  developing and consolidating 
democracy in these countries, and to that of  respecting the 
human rights and fundamental freedoms of their citizens. 
The developing countries also have to be integrated gradu-
ally into the world economy. 
These principles are the sine qua non for the third-generation 
agreements between the EC and third countries, at present 
the most advanced instrument of  Community cooperation. 
Besides the democratic underpinning of  cooperation, these 
agreements also cover economic cooperation, comprising 
seven types  of instrument:  trade promotion,  industrial 
cooperation, cooperation in energy matters, scientific and 
technological cooperation, vocational training, support for 
regional integration and environmental protection measures. 
The EC has signed third-generation agreements with vari-
ous Latin American countries: Argentina, Brazil, Chile, 
Mexico, Paraguay and Uruguay. The agreement with Mex-
ico does not include the clause which makes cooperation de-
pendent on a democratic system, since Mexico regards the 
choice of  democracy as a question of  national sovereignty. 
It is hoped that the negotiations with the Andean and Cen-
tral American Pact on this type of agreement will be con-
cluded shortly. 
At present the European countries and the EC institutions 
are the most important source of  official development aid 
(ODA) for Latin America- US  $1,291 million in 1990. This 
sum exceeds the aid granted by the US and Japan in the same 
period. In 1990 about 50% of ODA from the European 
countries went to the Andean Group. The MERCOSUR and 
Central American countries received the other half  in equal 
proportions.  Besides  bilateral  cooperation,  there is  hi-
regional cooperation between the EC and Latin America. 
The EC's ODA was 35 million ECU in 1980, rising to 265 
million ECU in 1991 , and totalling 1  ,596 million ECU be-
tween 1980 and 1991. 
The bilateral cooperation agreements between the EC Mem-
ber States and the Latin American countries cover bilateral 
relations and cooperation initiatives aimed at establishing 
economic links, in particular through joint ventures. The 
beneficiary country must implement measures which sus-
tain the development of economic relations between both 
countries, such as those concerning the promotion of for-
eign investment. There are bilateral agreements of  this kind 
between Italy and Argentina, Brazil, Venezuela and Chile, 
and between Spain and the same countries plus Mexico, 
Bolivia and Ecuador. 
This trend towards the development of  economic and indus-
trial cooperation through the promotion of  private invest-
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in the recipient countries, along with concern for the social 
dimension and the social effects of  cooperation, signify a 
more active participation by new independent partners in 
development cooperation relations between the two regions: 
private-sector  operators  and  institutions  and  non-
governmental organizations (NGOs). 
As regards cooperation with Latin American NGOs, the 
dominant view is that the Latin American organizations 
should establish agreements directly with the European 
NGOs. Such a practical approach is positive in that it ac-
cords the various organizations in both regions a degree of 
independence in the identification of priorities and in the 
planning  and  implementation  of  their  projects  and 
programmes. Furthermore, the EC has resources to fmance 
measures carried out by European NGOs in third countries, 
giving priority to areas such as the defence of  human rights 
and development projects in the LDCs. 
The cultural aspects of  cooperation are reflected in most of 
the agreements between the EC or its Member States and 
Latin American countries, extending to the promotion of 
cooperation in the communications and training spheres. An 
awareness of  a shared cultural heritage is also seen as a cor-
nerstone of  relations between Europe and Latin America. 
Conclusions 
The changes in international relations have unquestionably 
had a major impact on the economic recovery recently 
achieved by various Latin American countries. At the same 
time this recovery is the result of  the change of  direction ef-
fected by these countries themselves in their economic poli-
cy. Nevertheless, the outcome of  the GATT negotiations, 
the development of the European internal market and the 
economic trend in the US will have a decisive bearing on 
whether Latin America succeeds in sustaining its econom-
ic progress. Unless it can expand its markets, the present 
recovery could well be very short-lived. 
A successful conclusion to the GATT negotiations is par-
ticularly important for Latin America. Many Latin Ameri-
can countries have made a deliberate effort to organize their 
foreign trade in such a way as to comply with GA  TI  require-
ments. A breakdown in the negotiations will make Latin 
American access to the world market considerably more 
difficult. 
The strengthening of  the European and Japanese trading po-
sitions has undoubtedly been a major consideration in the 
US's move towards greater economic cooperation with the 
Latin American countries. Although most of  these countries 
are involved in cooperation with the US in one form or 
another, there is no need whatsoever to shut themselves off 
from the rest of  the world. There is as much interest as ever 
in the European market and European products. Increased 
European and Japanese investment and cooperation are a 
possibility. The EC has close political and cultural ties with 
Latin America and therefore has every reason to maintain 
and reinforce its presence in this region. 
The economic progress achieved with the structural adjust-
ment programmes frequently imposed by the international 
financial organizations should also be analyzed from a less 
short  -term point of view, with greater attention focussing 
on the impact of  an inappropriate high-speed privatization 
and deregulation policy with the consequent aggravation of 
social conditions. Sustained development requires the return 
of  national capital and the channelling of  investment to non-
traditional sectors. Moreover, the scope of  privatization re-
quires some re-thinking where it touches upon the dis-
mantling of the State's financial, productive and cultural 
potential. Despite the adjustment programmes, it has not 
been possible to bring public spending down in line with tar-
gets. Further fmancial crises therefore cannot be ruled out, 
and the foreign debt burden could still seriously hamper de-
velopment prospects. 
Countries with more stable capital markets, such as Mexi-
co, Chile, Argentina and Venezuela, have been more suc-
cessful in mobilizing resources for privatization by shares 
issues on the domestic and international markets. However, 
these programmes would be more effective if investment 
could be better targeted, since foreign investment seems to 
have tended to focus on already developed sectors, and has 
only played a limited part in diversifying production and ex-
ports. Moreover, new capital inflows seem mainly tied to 
short-term operations on the international securities mar-
kets, rather than providing a steady inflow of  capital. These 
flows can have a destabilizing effect: if  there are fixed ex-
change rates and high interest rates for example, a rise in 
short-term capital inflows speeds up money creation-par-
ticularly in a climate where the monetary authorities are try-
ing to freeze the money supply - and leads to appreciation 
of the local currency, fuelling inflation. 
Sustained economic development will remain difficult if  de-
pendency on foreign finance and investment and imports of 
capital goods, machinery and raw materials continues, par-
ticularly in oil-importing countries. Similarly, the techno-
logical gulf  between Latin America and the developed world 
cannot be bridged in the short term, although this is essen-
tial to greater competitiveness. 
Sustained development in the region could be galvanized if 
a consumer market enjoying reasonable purchasing power Conclusions  17 
can be created. Employment, pay, monetary, inflation, trade 
and production incentive policies should therefore take ac-
count of  the impact on the purchasing power of  the people 
and the distribution of  income. It is also important to take 
into ac.c~~t the real potential of  productivity levels. 
In brief, although economic recovery is fragile, it could be 
consolidated if  favourable domestic and external conditions 
prevail; likewise, sustained development calls for democra-
cy and social justice. The accumulated social debt of  recent 
years needs to be paid off  gradually over the coming years. 
The new impetus of Latin American integration schemes 
derives principally from a desire to open up trade, emphasiz-
ing the need to enter the international economy through im-
proved competitiveness and productivity. The EC is running 
support programmes for the integration processes:  such 
programmes must take account of  the need to prevent the 
countries with fewer resources becoming marginalized from 
the processes. Such processes must make provision for com-
pensatory mechanisms to strike a balance by channelling 
resources from the countries of  greatest potential towards 
the least developed, and integration schemes should com-
prise common social policies aimed at the most vulnerable 
groups and be provided with the means to ensure the par-
ticipation of the social actors. 
Moreover, some economic, political, social and church cir-
cles have spoken out on the risk that integration might favour 
the interests of  certain economic groups while marginaliz-
ing,  in particular, medium- and small-scale employers, 
while also failing to take sufficient account of  aspects of  em-
ployment, pay and labour policy which could be affected 
by the emergence of broader markets. 
Despite the continuity of  democracy in the region, a num-
ber of  countries are experiencing problems related to gover-
nability, the credibility of  democratic structures, corruption 
and inefficient administrations. The new international cli-
mate, for its part, is propitious to the consolidation of  La-
tin  American democracy.  EC-financed  programmes  to 
support democracy must therefore be maintained, expand-
ed and better funded. Democracy involves not only free 
elections, a parliamentary system and a popularly-elected 
government, but also an adequately-funded, independent ju-
dicial system and other means of  participation in decision-
making, and respect for citizens' human, civil and social 
rights in a context of  social justice and equality of  opportu-
nity. In this context it is particularly significant that the IVth 
General Episcopal Conference of  the Catholic Church of  La-
tin America, held in Santo Domingo in October 1992, criti-
cized structural adjustment polices and voiced concern at 
debt, deregulation and deterioration of  the environment, as 
having a direct effect on the rise in poverty. 
Although the human rights picture is improving, serious 
transgressions continue to occur in certain countries, while 
trade union rights are still violated in different ways and to 
different degrees in all the countries. Similarly, the social 
position of  women and the marginalization of  ethnic minori-
ties remain a feature in many countries, revealing the con-
tradiction between laws and international treaties on the one 
hand, and reality on the other. 
Against this backdrop, EC cooperation programmes for hu-
man rights, such as that signed with Central America on 
25 February 1992, assume special significance. Practical 
arrangements must also be sought to insert human rights 
clauses into treaties concluded between the EC and Latin 
American countries or groups of  countries. EC cooperation 
should include programmes involving a tripartite approach 
to encourage participation and promote mutual respect and 
cooperation between the social actors, and to promote so-
cial and trade union rights. 
The only trade instrument applying to Latin American trade 
with the EC is the Generalized System of  Preferences (GSP). 
However, its current operation is still inadequate. Further-
more, some EC countries impose quotas on imports from 
Latin America such as textiles and other agricultural and in-
dustrial products. Similarly, origin and shipment require-
ments have restricted the use of the GSP. Moreover, this 
complex system is little known in some countries. It is there-
fore clearly necessary for the EC to apply arrangements 
which facilitate the use of the GSP to Latin America's 
benefit. 
Careful thought should be given to the institutionalization 
and legalization of NGO and informal sector activities, 
together with other means offering the chance of  more ef-
fective action in favour of social justice, opening up alter-
native  paths  for  participation  and  bringing  about  a 
reinforcement of  civil society - while taking the necessary 
precautions to ensure that development aid programmes 
aimed at such entities do not generate dependency but pro-
mote effective self-sufficiency. Participative structures, a 
tripartite approach, official recognition of  the social func-
tion of  NGOs and an increase in continuous informal sec-
tor activities are all elements contributing to the creation of 
a balance of power. 
Cultural cooperation between the EC and Latin America still 
has no defined competences or proper instruments and, in 
most cases, does not figure in existing agreements. The hu-
man  and  cultural dimension  must  assume  greater  sig-
nificance, through comprehensive programmes to safeguard 
the historical, linguistic and ethnic heritage and through 
cooperation between universities, art centres and tourist in-
itiatives. 
The drug problem affects both producer and consumer coun-
tries. A policy fostering co-responsibility between the de-
veloped world and Latin America might help governments 
in their campaigns against drug production and trafficking. 
Such campaigns are directed against both supply and de-
mand, and involve not only police and financial measures, 
but  require  international  coordination  and  cooperation 
programmes to encourage alternative crops for poor farm-
ers producing cocaine or other drugs. The EC has granted 
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Central American products- except bananas- unti11994, 
as an anti-drug measure. The real impact of this measure 
will need to be assessed, and thought given to how to make 
better use of  the preferences and, most importantly, to the 
possibility of extending them beyond 1994. 
The worsening environmental situation in Latin America is 
an aspect of EC-Latin American relations which should 
receive special attention. The principle ofEC responsibili-
ty both within the Community and outside it was established 
at  the  Dublin  European  Council  of 25-26 June  1990. 
Cooperation in this field must be expanded, particularly con-
cerning damage to tropical forests and urban pollution. The 
consequences for the region of  the transfer of  certain types 
of  polluting industry and waste from the developed coun-
tries to parts of Latin America should also be examined. 
Natural resources cannot be protected, or used in a ration-
al and sustainable manner, if  poverty is not eliminated and 
the quality oflife oflocal inhabitants improved. Similarly, 
economic development must be accompanied by sufficient 
funding for environmental programmes. 
*  *  * 
Lastly, it should be pointed out that the EC has invested con-
siderable effort in adjusting development concepts, priori-
ties, areas and cooperation mechanisms with a view, in 
particular, to restructuring cooperation in such a way as to 
reach a balance between Latin America and the ACP coun-
tries. Cooperation planning on a five-year basis will help 
ensure continuity of  priority projects. EC participation via 
international cooperation programmes is highly positive. 
However, coordination and complementarity between EC 
and Member State development cooperation policy is still 
lacking: such coordination, as provided for in the Maastricht 
Treaty, would unquestionably contribute to greater effica-
cy. Furthermore, the social actors remain peripheral to 
decision-making and implementation procedures on cooper-
ation issues within international bodies, donor States and 
beneficiary States in both regions. Policy-making on  cooper-
ation and on economic and international relations are closely 
linked: consequently inter- and intra-regional contacts must 
be stepped up in order to ensure complementarity and off-
set any possible harmful effects on the development of  the 
countries concerned. 
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APPENDIX  I 
Features of the various integration and cooperation programmes 
MERCOSUR 
The Asunci6n Treaty, establishing the Southern Common 
Market (MERCOSUR), was signed on  26 March 1991. The 
rapprochement between Argentina and Brazil, initiated in 
1986, considered by many commentators to be the main 
forerunner of  this new phase, initially concentrated on in-
tensifying bilateral trade, focussing on making the two coun-
tries' industries more mutually compatible through specific 
agreements in the capital goods sector, central to the first 
stage ofbilateral integration. After five years, the two coun-
tries are appreciably closer: trade has doubled in six years, 
rising in value from US $1, 100 million in 1985 to approxi-
matelyUS $2,400in 1991. Bothcountriesarenowengaged 
on an ambitious project to create a common market by 1995, 
including Uruguay and Paraguay, under the title of  MER-
COSUR, representing a potential market of 190 million, 
with a per capita income of US $2,500. 
The impact of  this project on the economies of  the two coun-
tries has, however, to date been uneven: while Argentina 
has increased its share of  the Brazilian market considera-
bly, accounting for about 10% of  its exports, Brazilian sales 
to Argentina have not grown significantly and the structure 
of its external trade remains unchanged in its orientation 
towards the developed countries. The contrast in the recent 
progress of  these two economies - Argentina, with an ac-
ceptable level of  stabilization and incipient economic recov-
ery, and Brazil, still subject to instability and stagnation -
is generating concern in some circles as to the achievement 
in the medium term of the required convergence between 
them. 
There are signs that Bolivia and Chile may in the future join 
MERCOSUR, which would create a free trade zone encom-
passing 46% of  the Latin American population, more than 
55% of  its GOP, over 40% of  its exports and more than 70% 
of intra-regional trade. 39 of Latin America's leading 50 
companies belong to this group of  countries. 
Central American integration 
Following years of  acute regional crisis, similar targets are 
being set by the countries of  Central America with the adop-
tion of the Central American Economic Action Plan on 
15-17 June 1990 by the Presidents of  the Central American 
Common Market (CACM) countries plus Panama. The 
CACM comprises Guatemala,  El Salvador,  Honduras, 
Nicaragua and Costa Rica. After the 1980s, a period in 
which Central America underwent not only an acute eco-
nomic crisis but severe political disruption flowing from 
armed conflict, Central American leaders decided to give 
a new impetus to the integration process, under which com-
pletely free trade in agricultural produce should be in-
troduced in  1992, together with a  programme for the 
lowering of tariff barriers leading in 1994 to a Central 
American free trade area. 
It has also been decided to harmonize customs tariffs from 
1 January 1993. Central American integration had made ap-
preciable progress during the 1960s, with 26% of  its trade 
within the region by 1970; 20 years later this figure had 
fallen to 12%. The creation of  the Central American Integra-
tion System, under the terms of the Tegucigalpa Protocol 
of  13  December 1991, will represent a major step forward 
in putting the integration process on an institutional foot-
ing. The CACM has moved much closer to Panama and to 
the Caribbean Community (CARICOM), with the first hi-
regional meeting being held in San Pedro Sula, Honduras, 
on 29-31 January 1992. 
Nevertheless, the outlook for Central America is not en-
couraging: the region's 28 million inhabitants have a per 
capita income of  US $830-this means that 70% of  its popu-
lation cannot cover its basic needs.  A  small number of 
agricultural products such as coffee, bananas, sugar and cot-
ton account for 70% of  production. The economies of  these 
countries depend very closely on progress in the Uruguay 
Round and on the outcome of negotiations with the giant 
blocs, such as with the EC concerning bananas. It has been 
suggested that the EC might set up a quota system with a 
20% tariff on this product from 1993. This is opposed by 
the Latin American banana-exporting countries. Similarly, 
the fall in coffee prices in 1992 to approximately one-third 
of 1989 levels will hit the region hard. 
The Andean Pact 
The Andean Pact, a sub-regional group set up in 1969, had 
until recently made only the most modest progress in liber-
alizing trade. The Member States-Colombia, Venezuela, 
Peru, Ecuador and Bolivia-decided by means of  the La Paz 
Act, signed on 30 November 1990, to shorten the timescale, 
agreeing to set up a free trade area by 1992, followed by a 
customs union by 1995. Today, more than 20 years after 
its foundation, only 3. 8% of the Andean countries' total 
trade is intra-regional, highlighting the need for measures 
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However, progress has been interrupted as a result of re-
cent political and economic disagreement between Cartage-
na  Agreement  members  and,  in  particular,  by  other 
countries distancing themselves from Peru since the coup 
d'etat of  5 April1992. Peru has observer status until the end 
of 1993, while Bolivia has applied to join MERCOSUR, 
although the latter does envisage enlargement for several 
years. 
The Group of Three 
This is another body demanding serious attention, compris-
ing Mexico, Colombia and Venezuela, set up on 10 October 
1990. The Group, which plans to create a free trade zone 
in 1994, is noteworthy both for the degree of  similarity be-
tween a number of  its main export goods in particular-and 
for the fact that it is based on those economies which have 
demonstrated the liveliest growth rates in recent years and 
which are relatively homogeneous. Energy cooperation is 
indeed the central plank of  the process in the initial phase, 
providing its main impetus. These countries also have a spe-
cial relationship with Central America: since the San Jose 
Agreement of3 August 1980, Mexico and Venezuela sell 
oil to  the Central American countries at concessionary 
prices. 
Bilateral agreements 
Both MERCOSUR and the Group of  Three, together with 
an extensive network of  bilateral agreements built up over 
the last two years, including the Mexico-Chile agreement 
of  September 1991, share the particular feature of  going be-
yond the narrow confines of  the agreements traditionally ap-
plied within the Latin American Integration Association, 
typified by partial tariff reductions with loose deadlines for 
implementation. 
The Tuxtla Gutierrez Declaration, signed by Mexico and 
the five CACM nations on 11  January 1991, is a further ex-
ample, planning free trade by 1996. If  this general trend 
towards liberalization continues, growing convergence be-
tween the different integration bodies and various bilateral 
economic agreements is to be expected. 
Chile, which has signed important bilateral agreements with 
countries such as Argentina, Venezuela and Mexico, has 
decided not to become a member of  MERCOSUR, despite 
the invitation of  the member countries to join. The Chilean 
Government justified this decision on the grounds that Chile 
was ahead of the other countries of the Southern Cone in 
putting its public finances back on a sound footing and reduc-
ing inflation and -more importantly -had gone further than 
its partners in liberalizing its external trade, levying a sin-
gle 11% tariff and eliminating para-tariff restrictions. 
Chile, which quit the Andean Pact in 1976 because it dis-
agreed with the Group's then protectionist stance towards 
foreign investment, has left the door open for its future in-
tegration into MERCOSUR. Nevertheless, the country's 
economic policy-makers would seem to be satisfied with its 
broad range of  ties with other countries by means of  bilateral 
agreements and it is not likely that Chile, if  it does not fmd 
stable partners, will modify a type of regional integration 
from which it has benefited. It should not be forgotten that 
Chile, along with Colombia, was the only Latin American 
country to improve its per capita income during the 80s, at 
the same time substantially boosting its exports and attract-
ing considerable foreign investment. 
NAFTA 
Since 1989 Mexico has been drawing closer to the United 
States, culminating in the signing of  the NAFTA by Mexi-
co, the US and Canada on 13  August 1992. The setting-up 
of  a zone including Mexico was announced by the three par-
ties on 5 February 1991. Historically the greater part of 
Mexico's foreign trade has been with its northern neighbour 
and in recent years, with its rethink of  protectionist and na-
tionalist policies, it has decided to give priority to its integra-
tion in the North American economic area. However, 75% 
of  NAFT  A inter-regional trade is between Canada and the 
US, while Mexico-US trade accounts for 24% and Mexico-
Canada 1%. 
As part of  the process of  liberalization Mexico has succeeded 
in attracting a huge inflow of  foreign investment and in im-
proving its international image. 65% of direct foreign in-
vestment in Mexico comes from the US.  The economic 
policy-makers think that Mexico will be able to maintain its 
high growth rates and promote the modernization of the 
country by rapidly entering into a free trade agreement with 
the US and Canada. Critics think that most local industry 
would not be able to withstand North American competi-
tion and that the country would become a centre for assem-
bly  firms,  "screwdriver  plants",  and  would  import 
polluting industries from the other side of  the Rio Grande, 
exacerbating its external dependence. 
The Initiative for the Americas 
On 27 June  1990, one year after Mexico began its rap-
prochement with the US, the Bush Administration surprised 
the whole region by launching the Initiative for the Ameri-
cas. This initiative contained a proposal for the setting-up 
of  a free trade area throughout the whole region. It also in-
cluded proposals for an increase in investment, a reduction 
in debt and environmental programmes. 
In fact, the free trade agreements so far signed by the US 
with Chile, the MERCOSUR countries, Peru, El Salvador, 
Bolivia, Colombia, Costa Rica, Honduras, Venezuela and 
Ecuador are not strictly speaking liberalization agreements, 
but only framework agreements which set up the machinery 
for negotiation and consultation on trade and investment. 
Nevertheless, the Initiative for the Americas highlights the 
US's recognition of the special importance of the Latin-
American region for its commercial interests and illustrates 
the growing dynamism of  the region, thanks to the process 
of adjustment and liberalization and to its greater internal 
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The Latin-American countries have welcomed the proposal 
and very few of  them have seen in it an attempt by Washing-
ton to weaken, to its own advantage, Latin-American moves 
towards  integration.  On the contrary, the  proposal has 
generally been seen as a factor propitious to integration. A 
study published by the World Bank in 1992 contains an as-
sessment of  the effects of  the Initiative for the Americas on 
Latin American exports, concluding that it will be of  fairly 
limited benefit to these exports. The report asserts that only 
two countries in the region,  Brazil and Mexico, would 
receive 90% of  the benefits because of  the greater volume 
of their sales and their superior capacity to respond to the 
removal of  tariff and non-tariff barriers. The authors point 
out that for some of  the countries the benefits may be very 
limited and much less than those accruing to the US. 
The Latin American Integration Association 
(ALADI) 
Established by the Treaty of  Montevideo in 1980, ALADI pro-
motes the progressive reduction of  intra-regional trade barri-
ers  with  a view  to a Latin American common market.  It 
currently has 11 members: Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, 
Colombia, Ecuador, Mexico, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay and 
Venezuela. Members are divided into three categories accord-
ing to their level of  economic development, which determines 
the degree of  favourable trade status gnmted by the other mem-
ber countries. An important feature is the provision by the 
Treaty of Montevideo for its signatories to enter into partial 
trade agreements which do not necessarily extend to all 11 
members, the aim being to facilitate regional integration in 
different ways and in different stages, but always involving 
progress towards the final objective of  a Latin American com-
mon market.  ALADI also represents a common reference 
point for many sub-regional integration schemes, including 
lvfERCOSUR, the Andean Pact, the Chile-Mexico free trade 
agreement and a range of  other bilateral and sectorial arrange-
ments.  ALADI's  principal  institution  is  the  Council  of 
Ministers, comprising the Ministers for Foreign Affairs of the 
countries concerned. Its General Secretariat is responsible for 
providing technical assistance in customs and statistical issues. 
The Latin American Economic System (SELA) 
SELA was set up in 1975 with the aim of  promoting intra-
regional cooperation and establishing a permanent channel 
*  *  * 
of consultation and coordination between its 26 member 
States. Its highest authority, the Latin American Council, 
consisting of government ministers from all the member 
countries, meets annually. SELA's Permanent Secretariat, 
administered by the organization's Secretary-General, is 
based in Caracas. 
The Inter;..American Development Bank (IDB) 
Founded in 1959, the IDB is an international financial in-
stitution whose purpose is to boost economic and social de-
velopment in Latin America and the Caribbean. The Bank 
has 27 members in the region and 17 others from the rest 
of  the world, including a number ofEC countries. Decisions 
are taken by the Board of  Governors, on which each mem-
ber State is represented. The Bank also has a 12-member 
Executive Board, responsible for running its day-to-day 
operations.  The  Bank  has  to  date  released  almost 
US $ 150,000 million in project funds. Its basic credit cap-
ital rose to US $ 22,000 millions for the 1990-93 period. 
It is set to play an important part in the Initiative for the 
Americas investment programme. 
The Rio Group 
Originally known as the Group of  Eight, the title comes from 
the Declaration of 18 December 1986 on political cooper-
ation between the governments of  the region. Membership 
currently stands at 11: Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, 
Colombia, Ecuador, Mexico, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay and 
Venezuela.  Two  countries  have  observer  status:  one 
representing the Caribbean and another for Central Ameri-
ca.  Following President Fujimori's institutional coup of 
5 April 1992, Peru has not been invited to attend Group 
meetings. The Rio Group is at present Latin America's most 
active forum for discussion and active promotion of  integra-
tion, at the political cooperation level. The Group has offi-
ciallinks with the EC, with annual conferences of  Ministers 
for Foreign Affairs from the two groups. On 20 December 
1990, representatives of  the Ministries for Foreign Affairs 
of  the EC and relevant Latin American countries signed the 
Rome  Declaration,  which  includes  a  broad-ranging 
programme of mutual consultation and cooperation. The 
most recent joint EC-Rio Group meeting was held on 28-29 
May 1992 in Santiago, Chile. 
*  * Appendix 2  23 
APPENDIX  II 
Statistical tables 
Page 
Table I  Basic economic indicators for Latin America and other world regions . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  25 
Table ll  Basic social indicators for Latin America and other world regions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  25 
Table ill  Selected indicators on the Latin American presence in 
the international economic context, 1980 - 91  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  26 
Table IV  Principal indicators on the economic situation 
of Latin American countries, 1991  ....... ....... ..... ........... ......................  .....  27 
Table V  Latin American contribution to world production trade, 
services and foreign direct investment, 1985 and 1990 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  28 
Table VI  EC 12 trade with Latin America, 1974-1991 .. .................... ...................  ....  29 
Table Vll  EC share of Latin American imports and exports, 1974-1991 ........................  30 
Table Vill  Latin American share of EC imports and exports, 1974-1991 ........................  31 
Table IX  EC  12 imports from LA 20 by country and sub-regional groups, 1970-1990 ......  32 
Table X  EC  12 exports from LA 20 by country and sub-regional groups, 1970-1990 .......  33 
Table XI  EC 12, USA and Japan trade with LA 20, 1970-1990 ..................................  34 
Table Xll  Trade balance of EC  12, USA and Japan with LA 20, 1970-1990 ...................  35 
Table Xill  FDI flows from the EC to Latin America and the Caribbean 1980-1990 ............  36 
Table XIV  Latin America and the Caribbean: FDI flows from Europe, the USA and Japan . .  37 
Table XV  Overall EC Commission aid commitments by country and region 
of Latin America, 1976-1991  .............. ................... ......... ....... ... ...........  38 
Table XVI  Origin country of bilateral ODA received 
by Latin America from EC and other DAC countries, 1975-1990 ...................  39 
Table XVll lliiteracy  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  40 
Table XVIll Enrolment by level of education . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  41 
Table XIX  Public health expenditure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  42 
Table XX  Latin America and the Caribbean: urban unemployment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  43 
Table XXI  Human development index . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  44 
*  *  *  *  * Appendix2 
TABLBI 
BASIC ECONOMIC INDICATORS FOR lATIN ANERICA AND 0I11BR  WORLD REGIONS 
Latin  South  East  Sub- OEa> 
Amcriaa  Asia  Asia  Saharan  c:ouatrics 
Africa 
Population 1990 (millions)  433  1,148  1,577  495  m 
Average Annual Population 
Growth, 1980-1990 (%)  2.5  2.4  2.2  2.7  0.8 
Per capita GNP, 1990 
(US Dollars)  2,180  330  600  340  20,170 
Average Annual GDP Growth, 
1980-1990(%)  1.6  5.2  7.8  2.1  3.1 
Gross Domestic Investment, 
1990 (% of GDP)  19.0  21.0  37.0  16.0  22.0 
Average Annual Growth of 
Manufacturing Added Valve 
1980-1990 (%)  1.7  6.8  12.4  3.1  3.3 
Average Annual Export 
Growth 1980-1990  3.0  6.8  9.8  0.2  4.1 
(%) 
Degree of Openness to Trade, 
1990 (%)
1  22.1  19.1  53.7  40.8  305 
Sources:  World Bank, World Development Report 1992, Washington DC; and IREIA 
calculations 
TABLED 
BASIC SOCIAL INDICATORS FOR LATIN ANERICA AND O'lliER WORLD REGIONS 
Latin  South  East  Sub- OEa> 
Amcriaa  Asia  Asia  Saharan  c:ouatrics 
Africa 
Life Expectancy, 1990 
(Years)  68  58  68  51  77 
Adult Literacy Rate, 
1990 (%)  84  47  76  50  96 
Infant Mortality Rate 
1990 (Per 1000 
Births)  48  93  34  107  8 
Daily Calorie Intake, 
1989  2,721  2,215  2,617  2,122  3,417 
Sources:  World Bank, World Development Report 1992, Washington DC; and IREIA 
calculations 
Total combined exports and imports in relation to GDP. 
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TABLBW 
SEI.ECI'ED INDICATORS ON 'lHB lATIN AMERICAN PRESENCE IN 'lHB INfi!RNADONAL ECONOMIC CONIEXT, 
1980-1991 
1980  1985  1988  1989  1990  1991 
Total Debt (Millions of US 
Dollars)  242,596  390,893  428,150  428,150  431,091  429,174 
Secondary  Market External Debt 
(Average% of face value)  64.2  37.7  42.7  31.7  32.6  40.2 
External Debt as % of GDP  35.1  61.1  54.1  47.5  40.8  37.4 
External Debt as %  of exports 
of goods and setvices  197.1  316.0  314.9  2n.2  261.4  268.0 
Debt-Setvice Ratio (as % of 
exports of goods and setvices)  37.4  38.6  40.1  29.6  25.3  29.6 
FDI flow towards Latin America 
(millions of US Dollars)  6,115  4,290  7,999  7,175  8,147  9,782 
Latin  America as a Recipient 
of net FDI flows  to developing 
countries (%)  66.2  40.4  40.9  30.4  32.3  39.6 
Resource Transferl 
(US $ 1,000 millions)  13.1  -32.3  -28.8  -28.3  -16.0  6.7 
Sources:  World  Bank,  World  Debt Tables, Washington  DC;  Economic  Commission  for Latin America and the 
Caribbean (ECLAC) 1991 Preliminary results of the Latin American and Caribbean economy,  Santiago de 
Chile; and IRELA calculations 
Net capital flow excluding interest payments and profit expatriation; ECLAC estimates. Appendix 2 
TABLBIV 
PRINOPAL INDICATORS ON niB  ECONOMIC SIIUA'IlON OF I.A'IlN  AMERICAN OOUNI1UES, 1991 
(%data) 
Bxtcmal Debt - " 
Annual GDP  Annual Export  of  cxporiS of  goods 
Growth  Growth  and &ervica 
Caribbean 
Dominican Republic  -0.7  5.5  218 
Haiti  -0.4  -10.1  464 
Mexico and Central Amcric:a 
Costa Rica  -0.2  105  180 
El Salvador  3.1  7.1  220 
Guatemala  2.0  2.8  159 
Honduras  -1.9  -1.8  307 
Mexico  4.8  15  258 
Nicaragua  -0.4  -9.7  2,441 
Panama  9.3  205  122.4
3 
South America 
Argentina  5.0  -5.3  436 
Bolivia  3.5  -8.5  386 
Brazil  0.0  1.9  344 
Chile  5.1  6.6  158 
Colombia  2.0  6.1  181 
Ecuador  2.9  3.5  363 
Paraguay  2.5  -8.0  120 
Peru  2.0  1.3  430 
Uruguay  3.0  -4.5  337 
Venezuela  9.2  -9.1  196 
Source:  IDB, 1991 Annual Report, Washington DC, 1992; IMP, Direction of Trade Statistics, various issues, 
Washington DC; Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (EClAC), 1991 
Preliminary results of the Latin American and Caribbean economy, Santiago de Chile; and IREIA 
calculations. 
1990 data. 
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TABLBV 
LA11N  AMBRICAN  CONI1UBUDON TO  WORlD  PRODUCDON,  TRADF.,  SERVICES  AND  FORFJGN  DIRECf 
INVF.SJMF..NT, 198S AND 1990 
% Contribution  198S  1990 
World GDP  4.6
4  4.6 
World Exports
5  6.2  4.9 
World Imports  3.8  3.7 
Income from services
6  4.2  4.0 
Payments for services
7  4.6  4.1 
Inward FDI  8.8  4.0 
Outward FDI  0.2  0.2 
Source:  IMP, Balance of Payments Statistics Yearbook 1991, Washington DC;  IMP, Direction of Trade Statistics Yearbook 1991, 
Washington DC;  World Bank, World Development Report 1992, Washington DC. 
1986 data. 
Excluding intra-EC trade. 
Income and payments for services are based on service balance data; interest-bearing securities are excluded. 
See above. E
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TABLE VB 
BC SHARE OF lATIN AMERICAN IMPORTS AND EXPORTS, 1974-1991 
(as%) 
Year  Imports  II 
1974  24.1 
I 
1975  24.2 
1976  23.2 
1977  22.1 
1978  22.4 
1979  20.5 
1980  19.1 
1981  18.0 
1982  17.6 
1983  16.7 
1984  16.4 
1985  17.4 
1986  22.4 
1987  21.0 
1988  20.0 
1989  18.4 
1990  15.9 
1991  II 
16.3  II 
Exports 
23.7 
25.5 
24.7 
26.0 
25.2 
26.2 
23.8 
22.4 
23.4 
23.4 
21.8 
22.9 
23.3 
22.3 
. 24.4 
23.8 
22.5 
22.1 
Source:  IMF Direction of Trade Statistics, various issues, Washington DC and IREIA calculations. 
I 
I Appendix2 
TABLEVIU 
lATIN AMERICAN SHARE OF EC IMPORTS AND EXPORTS, 1974-1991 (as %) 
Year  Edra-EC•  Trade with Developing Countries 
Imports  Exports  Imports  Exports 
1974  6.0  6.9  12.2  20.8 
1975  5.9  7.1  13.0  18.4 
1976  5.1  6.2  12.4  16.0 
19n  6.5  6.2  13.9  15.2 
1978  5.9  6.0  13.9  14.5 
1979  6.0  6.3  13.8  16.2 
1980  5.9  6.3  12.9  15.4 
1981  6.5  6.4  14.2  14.3 
1982  6.6  5.4  15.3  12.3 
1983  7.3  4.3  18.0  10.4 
1984  7.2  4.3  18.6  11.5 
1985  7.5  4.1  19.4  12.1 
1986  6.1  4.2  18.9  13.5 
1987  5.8  4.1  18.1  13.3 
1988  6.0  3.8  20.1  12.1 
1989  5.9  3.8  19.3  11.9 
1990  5.6  3.7  17.8  11.7 
1991  5.3  4.3  17.4  12.7 
Sources:  EUROSfAT, Foreign Trade, various editions, Brussels-Luxembourg; EUROSTAT, Analysis of EC-
Latin America Trade, Brussels-Luxembourg 1984; and IREIA calculations. 
1  Total EUR12 trade, excluding trade between EC Member States. 
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I 
TABLE XI 
EC 12, USA AND JAPAN TRADE W1'111l.A 20, 1970-1990 
(values in millions of US$) 
Year 
1970 
1975 
1980 
1981 
1982 
1983 
1984 
1985 
1986 
1987 
1988 
1989 
1990 
I 
EC12 
I 
USA 
I 
JAPAN 
Imports  I 
Ezports  Imports  I 
&ports  Imports  I 
&ports 
5,006  3,905  5,on  5,698  1,343  995 
9,799  10,415  12,617  15,669  2,466  4,493 
23,216  19,156  31,318  36,053  5,584  8,179 
22,982  18,901  33,539  38,951  6,495  9,729 
21,636  14,937  33,929  30,095  6,078  8,203 
22.213  11,417  37,291  22,621  6,286  5,452 
22,307  11,863  44,288  26,303  7,012  7,354 
23,110  11,874  45,492  27,852  6,076  7,257 
20,000  14,2n  41,560  27,969  5,927  8,147 
22,681  16,072  46,427  31,573  6,037  7,736 
27,676  16,240  51,160  39,855  7,934  8,089 
29,150  17,269  57,410  44,375  8,392  8,144 
32,704  20,033  64,209  49,423  8,796  92,570 
Sources:  European Parliament, Directorate-General for Research, Trade Relations between the European Community and 
Latin America, Statistical Reference Series 1, Brussels-Luxembourg; EC Commission, EUROSTAT, External Trade 
Statistics, various issues, Brussels-Luxembourg; IMP, Direction of Trade Statistics, various issues, 
Washington; and IRELA calculations. 
I Appendix 2 
TABLHXll 
TRADE BAlANCE OF EC 12, USA AND JAPAN WITH lA  20, 1970-1990 
(Values in millions of US$) 
ECU  USA  JAPAN 
Year  Trade Balance  ICR  Trade Balance  ICR  Trade Ba1anc:c  ICR 
(%)1  (%)1  (%)1 
1970  -1,101  78.0  621  112.2  -348  74.1 
1975  616  106.3  3,052  124.2  2,027  182.2 
1980  -4,060  82.5  4,735  115.1  2,595  146.5 
1981  -4,081  82.2  5,412  116.1  3,234  149.8 
1982  -6,699  69.0  -3,834  88.7  2,125  135.0 
1983  -10,796  51.4  -14,670  60.7  -834  86.7 
1984  -10,444  53.2  -17,985  59.4  342  104.9 
1985  -11,236  51.4  -17,640  61.2  1,181  119.4 
1986  -5,723  71.4  -13,591  67.3  2,220  137.5 
1987  -6,609  70.9  -14,854  68.0  1,699  128.1 
1988  -11,436  58.7  -11,305  n.9  155  102.0 
1989  -11,881  59.2  -13,035  77.3  -248  97.0 
1990  -12,671  61.3  -14,786  76.97  -467  95.02 
Sources:  European Parliament, Directorate-General for Research, Trade Relations between the European Community 
and Latin America, Statistical Reference Series 1, Brussels-Luxembourg; EC Commission, EUROSTAT, External 
Trade Statistics, various issues, Brussels-Luxembourg; IMF, Direction of Trade Statistics, various issues, 
Washington; and IRELA calculations. 
ICR: Percentage of imports covered by exports 
35 I 
36  EC/Latin American relations 
TABLBXID 
FDI FLOWS FROM 111E EC TO lATIN AMERICA AND 11IE CARIBBEAN, 1980-90 
(in us s  milli.oo&) 
Countty  I 
1980-84  I 
1985  I 
1986  I 
1987  I 
1988  I 
1989 
Argentina  937  100  116  316  201  188 
Brazil  2,818  268  472·  693  970  718 
Chile  336  73  46  80  214  218 
Colombia  118  6  15  -38  28  99 
Dominican 
Republic  24  1  2  2  8  6 
Ecuador  31  1  -2  11  20  63 
Guatemala  252  154  4  -15  1  3 
Mexico  639  78  58  420  178  -176 
Paraguay  64  -10  6  2  4  6 
Peru  33  28  6  19  21  6 
Uruguay  77  2  10  6  13  56 
Venezuela  189  47  41  105  160  65 
Others  84  -3  67  -49  -2  24 
TOTAL  5,602  745  841  1,552  1,816  1,276 
Off-shore 
centres  2,862  767  68  477  2,239  626 
Unidentified 
and unspecified 
flows  610  1,104  29  8  116  94 
GRAND  9,074  2,616  938  2,037  4,171  1,996 
TOTAL 
Note - These figures include Spanish official development aid. 
I 
1990  I 
1985-90  I 
1980-90  I 
221  1,142  2,079 
536  3,657  6,476 
80  711  1,047 
53  162  280 
19  38  62 
15  107  138 
-5  142  394 
318  877  1,516 
7  14  78 
12  93  126 
48  135  212 
20  439  628 
24  60  143 
1,348  7,577  13,179 
801  4,978  7,840 
166  1,348  1,936 
2,315  14,074  23,146 
Source:  OECD, Database on FDI flows  to Developing Countries, Paris; Secretaria de Estado para el Comercio, Ministerio de 
Industria, Comercio y Turismo, Sector exterior 1990, Madrid. Appendix 2 
TABlE XIV 
lATIN AMERICA AND TilE CARIBBEAN: F'DI FLOWS FROM EUROPI; TilE USA AND JAPAN
1 
(cmuding off-chore ccntn:s) (US$ millions) 
I 
I 
I 
Country 
I 
1979-
I 
1983-
I 
1987-
I  I  I  I  I  I 
1982  1986  1990  198S  1986  1987  1988  1989  1990 
Belgium  89  24  136  13  9  26  57  -5  58 
France  1,161  394  588  174  49  784  111  112  281 
Germany  1,458  721  1,366  66  67  377  398  302  2.89 
Italy  322  473  477  122  8  97  210  114  56 
Netherlands  204  350  480  25  137  48  17  122  293 
Spain  722  303  706  45  61  89  148  187  282 
Switzerland  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a. 
U.K.  1,141  1,241  2,561  286  507  805  842  437  477 
Europe  5,097  3,506  6,314  733  838  1,525  1,783  1,269  1,736 
USA  I 
8,524  I 
-415  I 
8,412  I 
-747  I 
256  I 
708  I 
943  I 
3,544  I 
3,217 
Japan  I 
2,058  I 
555  I 
1,364  I 
-159  I 
116  I 
-23  I 
471  I 
343  I 
573 
Note: Spanish FDI figures are not strictly comparable with FDI data published by the OECD. For further information 
see Annex I. 
Sources:  OECD, Paris, Official Development Administration, Statistical Department, (unpublished data), London, 
and Secretaria de Estado de Comercio, Ministerio de Industria, Comercio y Turismo, Sector exterior 
1990, Madrid. 
1  Values refer to all data which could be specified by country. 
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TABU! XV 
OVERAlL EC COMMISSION AID COMMrnmNTS BY COUNTRY AND REGION OF IA'I1N AMERICA, 1976-1991 
(values in US S millions and as pcrcmfa&C) 
I  I 
1976 
I 
1991 
I 
1976-1991 
Millions of  I 
Millions of  I 
Millions of  I 
Aid to countries  Dollars  %  Dollars  %  Dollars 
ARGENTINA  - - 4,436  1.7  21,663 
BOLIVIA  2,583  17.4  25,301  9.5  226,517 
BRAZIL  0,190  1.3  17,487  6.6  75,825 
COLOMBIA  0,034  0.2  12,918  4.9  70,299 
COSTA RICA  0,022  0.2  1,850  0.7  43,122 
CUBA  - - 1,803  0.7  36,671 
CHILE  0,894  6.0  24,610  9.3  93,712 
ECUADOR  0,022  0.2  15,625  5.9  75,904 
ELSALVADOR  0,022  0.2  17,711  6.7  71,697 
GUATEMALA  0,906  6.1  22,869  8.6  87,123 
HAm  4,696  31.7  5,010  1.9  98,332 
HONDURAS  3,287  22.2  3,569  1.3  121,648 
MEXICO  0,034  0.2  10,200  3.8  53,129 
NICARAGUA  0,045  0.3  28,963  10.9  268,940 
PANAMA  - - 0,146  0.1  6,993 
PARAGUAY  0,123  0.8  17,205  6.5  28,159 
PERU  1,342  9.0  46,244  17.4  225,561 
DOMINICAN REPUBLIC  0,235  1.6  4,415  1.7  32,099 
URUGUAY  0,358  2.4  3,897  1.5  17,589 
VENEZUELA  0,034  0.2  1,528  0.6  7,092 
TOTAL COUNTRIES  14,825  100.0  265,786  100.0  1,662,076 
I 
AID TO REGIONS  I  I  I  I  I  I 
LA TIN AMERICA  - 24,494  26.1  101,412 
CENTRAL AMERICA  - 54,435  58.1  284,675 
SOUTH AMERICA  - 13,656  14.6  15,962 
ANDEAN PACT  - 1,169  1.2  83,369 
I 
TOTAL REGIONS  I  I  - I 
93,754  I 
100.0  I 
485,418  I 
I 
TOTAL AID  I 
14,825  I  I 
359,540  I  I 
2,147,494  I 
I  COUNTRY  /REGION AID RATIO  I  1001 o  I  I  74126  I  I  11123  I 
Source:  EC Commission, Etat d'engagements des projets communautaires au 5 mai 1992, Brussels. 
%  I 
1.3 
13.6 
4.6 
4.2 
2.6 
2.2 
5.6 
4.6 
4.3 
5.2 
5.9 
7.3 
3.2 
16.2 
0.4 
4.7 
13.6 
1.9 
1.1 
0.4 
100.0 
I 
20.9 
58.6 
3.3 
17.2 
100.0  I 
I 
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TABLE XVI 
ORIGIN BY COUNTR.Y OF BILA'IERAL ODA RECEIVED BY LATIN AMERICA FROM EC AND O'IHER DAC COUNTRIES, 
1975-1990 (net disbUISCIDCnts, values in miDioDs of US$ and as pcn:cnta&e of total) 
I  I 
1975 
I 
191K» 
I 
198S 
I 
1990 
I 
DONOR COUNTR.Y  VALUE I 
%  VALUE I 
%  VALUE  I 
%  VALUE  I 
% 
Belgium  14.2  2.30  18.6  2.00  12.2  0.60  34.9  1.11 
Denmark  2.1  0.34  4.4  0.47  5.7  0.28  23.2  0.74 
FRGermany  128.0  20.77  262.3  28.27  203.2  10.03  481.9  15.33 
France  15.1  2.45  49.2  5.30  103.4  5.11  196.0  6.24 
Italy  4.8  0.78  6.7  0.72  69.1  3.41  338.6  10.n 
Netherlands  25.8  4.19  103.2  11.12  82.2  4.06  190.6  6.06 
UK  33.0  5.35  20.5  2.21  13.0  0.64  26.7  0.85 
Total DAC-EC  223.0  36.18  464.9  50.10  488.8  24.14  1,291.9  41.10 
USA  306.0  49.65  281.0  30.28  1,204.0  59.46  1,066.0  33.91 
Japan  46.6  756  117.2  12.63  194.7  9.61  482.4  15.35 
Total DAC  616.3  100.0  928.0  100.0  2,025.0  100.0  3,143.1  100.00 
Sources:  OECD, Geographical Distribution of Financial Flows, various issues, Paris; and IREI.A calculations. 40  EC/Latin American relations 
TABLEXVD 
II..Lll'BRACY 
(Pen:entage of the population ap:d 1S or 11101e) 
I  I 
About 
I 
Countty  1970  I 
1980  I 
1~  I 
1990
11 
Argentina  7.4  6.1  5.2  4.7 
Barbados  O.'P  0.512  ...  .  .. 
Bolivia  36.8  ...  27.5  22.5 
Brazil  33.8  25.5  21.5  18.9 
Colombia  19.2  12.2
11  15.3  13.3 
Costa Rica  11.6  7.4  8.2  7.2 
Cuba  ...  2.212  7.6  6.0 
Chile  11.0  8.9  7.8  6.6 
Ecuador  25.8  16.5  17.0  14.2 
El Salvador  42.9  32.7
11  31.2  27.0 
Guatemala  54.0  44.2  48.1  44.9 
Guyana  8.412  ...  4.6  3.6 
Haiti  78.7  62.5  51.2  47.0 
Honduras  43.1  ...  32.0  26.9 
Jamaica  3.9
12  ...  2.0  1.6 
Mexico  25.8  16.0  15.3  12.7 
Nicaragua  42.5  ...  13.0  ... 
Panama  18.7  12.9  13.6  11.9 
Paraguay  19.9
10  12.3  11.7  9.9 
Peru  27.5  18.1  18.0  14.9 
Dominican Republic  33.0  31.413  19.6  16.7 
Surinam  ...  35.014  7.3  5.1 
Trinidad and Tobago  7.8  5.1  3.9  ... 
Uruguay  6.1  5.0  4.7  3.8 
Venezuela  23.5  15.3  14.3  11.9 
Source:  ECIAC, 1991. 
UNESCO estimate. 
UNESCO estimate. Persons without school education have been counted as illiterate. 
10  Persons without school education have been counted as illiterate. 
II  Population aged 10 or more. 
12  Population aged 10-49. 
13  Excluding the forest-dwelling indigenous population. Population aged 5 or more. 
Excluding the forest-dwelling indigenous population. ENROLMENT BY LEVFJ.. OF FDUCADON 
(a) First level education 
(Gross enrolment rates)
15 
I 
COUNfRY 
I 
AGE 
I 
GROUP
16 
Argentina  6-2 
Barbados  5-10 
Bolivia  6-13 
Brazil  7-14 
Colombia  6-10 
Costa Rica  6-11 
Cuba  6-11 
Chile  6-13 
Ecuador  6-11 
El Salvador  7-15 
Guatemala  7-12 
Guyana  6-11 
Haiti  7-12 
Honduras  7-12 
Jamaica  6-11 
Mexico  6-11 
Nicaragua  7-12 
Panama  6-11 
Paraguay  7-12 
Peru  6-11 
Dominican Republic  7-12 
Surinam  6-11 
Trinidad and Tobago  5-11 
Uruguay  6-11 
Venezuela  7-12 
Source:  ECI.AC, 1991. 
Appendix 2 
TABLBXVDI 
1970 
I 
1980 
I 
1982 
I 
113.6  106.0  112.1 
108.0  100.0  103.0 
76.2  84.0  85.5 
78.7  99.0  101.6 
105.0  102.1  103.1 
109.6  105.6  101.2 
123.1  105.7  108.3 
104.8  108.8  105.6 
99.4  112.8  114.3 
61.4  74.9  70.1 
58.3  70.8  70.2 
99.0  95.0  95.0 
46.2  76.0  81.0 
87.3  92.8  99.3 
119.0
17  103.0  105.5 
103.5  115.0  120.0 
80.0  99.0  105.8 
102.0  106.2  104.8 
104.9  103.7  103.6 
106.6  114.0  118.0 
98.4  117.6  115.1 
131.0  125.0  ... 
107.0  99.0  98.0 
112.1  106.4  108.8 
98.6  108.7  110.3 
198S 
I 
1986 
I 
1987 
I 
1988 
I 
1989 
I 
1990 
107.0  109.0  110.0  111.0  ...  ... 
111.2  ...  ...  ...  ...  ... 
...  87.0  91.0  81.0  81.0  ... 
101.0  103.0  101.0  103.7  105.0  ... 
107.0  98.1  106.0  106.0  107.0  ... 
97.2  99.3  99.7  100.7  100.0  ... 
104.1  101.4  105.0  104.0  103.0  ... 
106.0  105.0  103.0  102.0  100.0  98.0 
116.9  118.0  118.0  ...  ...  .. . 
77.2  ...  79.0  80.0  78.0  ... 
75.5  75.5  77.0  79.0  ...  ... 
103.0  106.0  ...  ...  ...  ... 
96.0  83.0  84.0  ...  ...  .. . 
109.5  112.2  113.1  114.2  ...  ... 
100.0  99.8  101.0  104.0  105.0  ... 
119.0  119.0  118.0  117.0  114.0  112.0 
101.0  98.0  99.0  99.0  95.0  ... 
105.0  106.0  106.3  105.6  106.5  ... 
103.0  102.0  103.0  103.8  106.0  ... 
122.0  118.9  118.6  120.0  123.0  126.0 
126.0  101.0  98.0  ...  95.0  .  .. 
132.0  129.0  ...  124.0  ...  .  .. 
96.0  98.0  99.0  ...  97.0  .  .. 
110.0  110.0  106.0  106.0  ...  .  .. 
108.0  107.0  106.0  105.0  ...  .  .. 
15  Total enrolments in the corresponding age-group population, multiplied by 100. The comparability of this data is affected 
by changes in the educational systems of certain countries, set out in the explanatory notes. 
16  Legal age limits of the population considered in the denominator of the gross enrolment rate. 
17  Age limits: 6 to 10 years. 
41 
I 42 
PUBUC HEALTII EXPENDfiURE
18 
(Percentage of GDP at current prices) 
I 
Couatty  I 
1970 
Argentina  0.3 
Bahamas  ... 
Barbados  5.0 
Bolivia  0.9 
Colombia  ... 
Costa Rica  ... 
Chile  1.7 
Ecuador  0.5 
El Salvador  1.3 
Guatemala  ... 
Guyana  2.1 
Haiti  1.1 
Honduras  1.5 
Jamaica  ... 
Mexico  ... 
Nicaragua  0.7 
Panama  1.8 
Paraguay  2.0 
Peru  0.9 
Dominican Republic  ... 
Trinidad and Tobago  ... 
Uruguay  ... 
Venezuela  1.7 
Source:  ECIAC, 1991. 
I 
1980 
05 
2.4 
5.0 
1.7 
4.8 
11.3 
2.1 
1.8 
1.5 
1.6 
4.1 
0.8 
2.2 
... 
0.4 
4.4 
1.6 
0.4 
0.8 
2.0 
1.3 
1.0 
1.3 
EC/Latin American relations 
TABLE XIX 
I 
1982 I 
1985  I 
1986 
0.3  05  0.6 
2.7  2.7  2.9 
4.1  4.0  4.1 
0.4  0.4  ... 
4.4  5.0  4.4 
6.3  6.8  ... 
3.6  2.7  2.0 
2.2  1.1  1.1 
3.7  2.9  ... 
1.4  0.7  1.0 
4.9  4.2  4.0 
1.3  0.9  ... 
3.1  2.0  2.6 
10.6  6.1  6.2 
0.3  0.3  0.4 
4.4  5.0  6.6 
1.6  1.8  1.6 
0.5  0.7  0.4 
0.8  1.0  1.0 
1.2  1.0  1.0 
2.3  2.7  3.0 
1.0  1.0  1.2 
1.7  1.8  2.0 
18  Consolidated central government expenditure. 
19  Provisional figures. 
20  Official estimates. 
I 
1987  I 
1988  I 
1989  I 
1990  I 
0.6  ...  ...  ... 
.  ..  ...  .  ..  .  .. 
4.2  ...  ...  ... 
...  ...  ...  ... 
5.0  5.0  45  3.6 
5.5  5.9  5.7  ... 
...  ...  ...  .  .. 
1.4  1.3  1.1  ... 
...  ...  ...  ... 
...  ...  ...  .  .. 
4.4  ...  ...  ... 
...  ...  ...  .  .. 
2.2  ...  ...  .  .. 
6.0  6.2  6.9  ... 
0.3  0.3  ...  ... 
...  ...  ...  .  .. 
2.0  1.9  ...  ... 
0.4  ...  ...  ... 
1.0  1.0  1.019  0.820 
...  ...  ...  .  .. 
3.2  ...  ...  ... 
1.1  1.1  1.3  1.4 
...  ...  ...  ... Appendix2  43 
TABLE XX 
LATIN AMERICA AND TilE CARIBBEAN: URBAN UNEMPLOYMHNr 
(Average annual rates) 
I 
I 
I 
I 
1983  I 
1984  I 
1985  I 
1986  I 
1987  I 
1988  I 
1989  I 
1990  I 
1991.  I 
Argentinab  4.7  4.6  6.1  5.2  5.9  6.3  7.6  7.4  6.5 
Boliviac  8.5  6.9  5.8  7.0  7.2  11.6  10.2  9.5  8.1 
Brazild  6.7  7.1  5.3  3.6  3.7  3.8  3.3  4.3  5.0 
Colombia•  11.7  13.4  14.1  13.8  11.8  11.2  9.9  10.3  10.3 
Costa Ricab'  8.5  6.6  6.7  6.7  5.9  6.3  3.7  5.4  5.0 
Chile11  19.0  18.5  17.0  13.1  11.9  10.0  7.2  6.5  7.9 
Ecuador"  6.7  10.5  10.4  10.7  7.2  7.4  7.9  ...  ... 
El Salvador'  ...  ...  ...  ...  ...  9.4  8.4  10.0  .  .. 
Guatemala
1  9.9  9.1  12.0  14.0  11.4  8.8  6.2  6.4  6.5 
HondurasJ  9.5  10.7  11.7  12.1  11.4  8.7  8.0  7.1  8.4 
Mexicok  6.6  5.7  4.4  4.3  3.9  3.5  2.9  2.9  2.6 
Panama'  11.7  12.4  15.7  12.7  14.1  21.1  16.3  16.8  15.1 
Paraguay'"  8.3  7.3  5.1  6.1  5.5  4.7  6.1  6.6  ... 
Peru"  I 
9.0  I 
8.9  I 
10.1  I 
5.4  I 
4.8  I 
7.1  I 
7.9  I 
8.3  I 
...  I 
Uruguay"  I 
15.5  I 
14.0  I 
13.1  I 
10.7  I 
9.3  I 
9.1  I 
8.6  I 
9.3  I 
9.2  I 
Venezuelab  11.2  14.3  14.3  12.1  9.9  7.9  9.7  10.5  10.9 
Source:  ECIAC and REPIAC, based on official figures. 
a  Preliminary figures.  b  National  urban. c National.  d Rio de Janeiro, Sao Paulo,  Belo Horizonte,  Porto Alegre, Salvador and  Recife 
metropolitan areas. • Bogota, Barranquilla, Medellin and Cali.  ' Statistics since 1987 are not strictly comparable with those from before 
as the methodology of the Multi-purpose Household Survey has been modified.  11  Greater Santiago. From 1983 onwards, figures are for 
the Santiago metropolitan area. Statistics since 1985 are not strictly comparable with those from before, due to changes in the design and 
size of the sample. h Total for the country. Since 1986, Permanent Household Survey in Quito and Guayaquil. ' Total country. J Total for 
country until1985; 1986, Urban Workforce Survey. 1987, Central District and San Pedro de Sula and five cities; 1988, national urban; 1989 
and thereafter Tegucigalpa. k Mexico city, Guadalajara and Monterrey metropolitan areas. 
1 Metropolitan region.m Asuncion, Fernando de 
Ia Mora, Lambare and Luque and San Lorenzo urban areas. " Metropolitan Lima.  o  Montevideo. T
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